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Introduction 
In what is sometimes referred to as ‘globalisation’s1 second unbundling’, logistical 
and technological innovations since the 1970s have allowed production stages, 
that were previously performed in close proximity, to be geographically dispersed 
in order to reduce production costs and increase production speeds (Gereffi 2013: 
10). This has intersected with export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) strategies to 
open up a radically different ‘development’ path, as free trade and flexible labour 
have been promoted as the most promising route to economic growth2 (Barrientos 
& Smith 2007: 715; Ruwanpura 2011: 198). Instead of attempting to build 
domestic supply chains from scratch through import-substitution industrialisation 
(ISI) strategies, developing3 countries now seek to industrialise by joining 
established supply chains to make specialised inputs or assemble final goods 
(Bonacich et al. 1994: 4-5; Gereffi 2013: 10).  
In this context, garment manufacturing has been transformed from a local and 
specialised skill into one of the most globalised industries (Bonacich et al. 1994: 3; 
Staritz 2010: 6). An estimated 40 million garment workers now produce around 80 
billion garments per year (Siegle 2011: ix) in ‘unseen, intricate supply chains that 
run like invisible webs around the globe’ (Hurley 2005: 95). Given that labour is 
typically one of the highest costs in garment manufacturing, this has led to what 
Palpacuer (2008: 411) refers to as a ‘vicious cycle’ of global downward pressure on 
wages and working conditions for labour at the bottom of such chains.4 
The global dispersion of labour-intensive production has therefore stimulated 
intense debate on how to protect and promote labour standards and workers’ 
rights5 within the ‘global factory’ (Mayer & Pickles 2010: 4-11). A large volume of 
                                                          
1 This thesis acknowledges the capitalist materialist basis of the phenomena captured by the term 
‘globalisation’, which Gimenez (2004: 86) argues is usually a ‘de-politicised and euphemistic way to 
refer to the spread of capitalism over the globe.’ It also acknowledges that while globalisation is not 
a new phenomenon, it entered a new phase in the 1970s (Kaur 2004: 37). 
2 This income-based conceptualisation of ‘development’ is contested. 
3 The terms ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ countries are used throughout this thesis, in line with the 
terminology used global commodity chains (GCC) researchers. 
4 This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the ‘race to the bottom’ in the academic literature. 
5 The distinction between labour standards and workers’ rights is further explored in Chapter One. 
‘Labour standards’ are minimum acceptable conditions in areas such as wages, working hours, and 
occupational health and safety. ‘Workers’ rights’ include freedom of association (i.e. the right to 
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academic, business and non-governmental organisation (NGO) publications exists 
on different aspects of this issue. The business and NGO literatures typically fixate 
on the need for market-led policy solutions and changing consumer behaviours, 
arguing that ‘every single one of our wardrobes is tainted’ (Siegle 2011: ix; 
emphasis added) by the ‘exploitation’ of ‘vulnerable’ workers. In this context, a 
plethora of new market-led labour governance instruments have emerged, 
including corporate codes of conduct, certification schemes, sectoral agreements, 
and trade agreements containing ‘labour clauses’ (Mayer & Pickles 2010: 5-9). 
These initiatives have typically achieved only limited improvements in labour 
compliance, which are often unsustainable, geographically isolated, and 
accompanied by perverse outcomes.  
The academic literature lacks depth from a political economic perspective, and the 
underlying assumption that there is no necessary contradiction between the 
pursuit of social values such as fair labour standards and continuing competitive 
accumulation through profit maximisation and continuous growth is rarely 
questioned (Pruett 2005: 78-79; Taylor 2011: 449). The material roots of poor 
labour standards and threats to workers’ rights in the capitalist labour process 
also remain under-theorised. Instead, studies typically engage with these 
instruments on their own terms and target particular ‘design flaws’, rather than 
problematising the market-led approach to labour governance itself. 
In this context, the seemingly ‘technical questions’ of policy design, 
implementation and monitoring ‘need to be conceptualised within the 
manifestations of power and uneven development that are central to the workings 
of global capitalism’ (Taylor 2011: 446). The global commodity chains (GCC) 
framework is a particularly influential approach to conceptualising and analysing 
contemporary capitalist dynamics in this manner (Goto 2011: 944; Starosta 2010: 
433). GCC analyses are principally concerned with understanding how global6 
industries are organised. They conceptualise commodity chains as sets of inter-
                                                                                                                                                                          
form a union), the right to bargain collectively, and the right to withhold one’s labour to improve 
working conditions (Barrientos et al. 2011: 325; Anner 2012: 610). 
6 In GCC terminology, ‘global’ refers to the distinction between internationalisation and 
globalisation. While the former ‘refers simply to the geographic spread of economic activities across 
national boundaries, ‘globalisation’ implies a degree of functional integration between these 
internationally dispersed activities’ (Gereffi 1994: 96). 
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firm networks which connect manufacturers, suppliers and subcontractors in 
global industries to one another, and ultimately to international markets (Bair 
2005: 156-157; Goto 2011: 944-945). As Bair (2008: 9) suggests, 
‘the same characteristics of international production networks in the 
[garment] industry that make them fascinating for commodity chain 
analysts – their organisational complexity and far-flung geography – pose 
challenges for those who want to reconcile trade liberalisation and the 
globalisation of manufacturing with the rights and interests of garment 
workers worldwide.’ 
Two GCC concepts are worth elucidating here. First, the process by which powerful 
‘lead firms’ at the ‘top’ of chains coordinate and control the activities of other 
participants is referred to as ‘governance’ (Bair 2008: 4; Gereffi 2013: 5). In 
labour-intensive commodity chains such as the garment industry, lead firms are 
referred to as ‘buyers’ because they typically have no equity relation to the 
subcontracting ‘supplier firms’ that manufacture goods on their behalf7 (Gereffi 
1994: 97-99). Lead firms determine much of distribution of risks and value along 
the chain, meaning their behaviour strongly influences outcomes for supplier firms 
(Bair 2009: 20). However, lead firms are also relatively free to pursue capital 
accumulation without fear of externally enforceable sanctions, given their market 
power and the globally dispersed nature of their operations (Barrientos & Smith 
2007: 714; Bonacich et al. 1994: 5-6).  
Second, the process by which economic actors seek to maintain or improve their 
position in commodity chains is referred to as ‘upgrading’ (Bair 2008: 5). The 
nature of the institutional arrangements between capital, labour and the state 
determine the extent to which greater competitiveness and profitability (known as 
‘economic upgrading’) translate into gains for labour through improved conditions 
and remuneration (known as ‘social upgrading’) (Selwyn 2013: 79). Firm-level 
                                                          
7 The terms ‘buyer’ and ‘supplier firm’ or ‘factory’ are used throughout this thesis in line with the 
terminology used by GCC researchers. While this terminology obfuscates the fact that ‘buyers’ do 
not simply purchase an end product, it provides efficient shorthand to denote firms’ position and 
functions within the garment commodity chain. 
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upgrading can be, and often is, achieved through the worsening of workers’ 
conditions within and beyond the workplace (Goto 2011: 945; Selwyn 2013: 76). 
Understanding this apparent contradiction in the experience of workers, through a 
political economy analysis of the Better Work economic and social upgrading 
program, constitutes the main aim of this research. The thesis comprises a 
theoretical, historical, institutional and empirical examination of both the Better 
Work program and its wider political-economic context. The Better Work program 
is arguably one of the most significant mechanisms of global labour governance 
(Hall 2010: 427). It targets garment producing countries at the ‘bottom’ of the 
garment commodity chain and is a vehicle through which the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) seeks to mediate the contradictions between the pursuit of 
decent labour conditions and the dynamics of competitive capital accumulation in 
the global economy (Taylor 2011: 450). Better Work provides factory monitoring, 
reporting, training, advisory services, and ‘social dialogue’ programs such as 
educational forums and contests (Better Work 2012a). It seeks to improve labour 
compliance (social upgrading) while strengthening factories’ competitiveness 
(economic upgrading) (Better Work 2012a). The program was established in 
Cambodia in 2001 under the name Better Factories Cambodia (BFC)8. By 2012 
Better Work was operational in Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Haiti, Jordan, 
Lesotho and Nicaragua, with plans to extend it to Bangladesh and Morocco (Better 
Work 2012a). 
Better Work is based on a market-driven enforcement model which relies on 
buyers’ reputation-sensitivity’ regarding labour conditions in their supply chains 
(Oka 2010: 62). It is hoped that buyers will base their sourcing decisions on factory 
monitoring results, ‘rewarding’ compliant factories with increased orders and 
either ‘punishing’ non-compliant factories through the withdrawal of orders or 
working with them to remediate violations (Seidman 2009: 588). The promise of 
an ‘ethical’ reputational advantage is the primary driver of Better Work’s 
geographical spread and acceptance by factory managers and developing economy 
states that seek to improve their competitive position, given their economies’ 
                                                          
8 Throughout this thesis, ‘BFC’ will be used to denote the Cambodian country program while ‘Better 
Work’ will be used to denote the global program, including Cambodia. 
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reliance on garment export earnings (Dicaprio 2013: 111). It is expected that 
workers and their unions will perceive the program to be in their best interest 
(Hale 2000: 354). However, BFC has had limited impact on workers’ remuneration, 
working conditions and union rights despite its presence in Cambodia for over a 
decade. Initial evidence suggests that Better Work programs in other countries are 
also struggling to promote progressive and sustainable improvements for workers. 
It is therefore important to reflect critically upon the GCC approach’s assumptions 
and implications, given the widespread acceptance of its theoretical and 
methodological principles. Adherents include academics, policy-makers and 
international institutions, social movement and union activists, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (Bair 2005: 162; Gereffi 2013: 15). The extant 
GCC literature tends to be capital-centric, emphasising inter-firm relations and 
technological innovation but treating the firm itself as a ‘black box’ (Coe et al. 
2008: 284). While numerous GCC analyses have sought to more adequately 
incorporate labour and the labour process, they have generally investigated how 
globalisation impacts on labour and frames workers as largely passive ‘victims’ of 
these processes (Selwyn 2012: 205-206). The GCC framework’s emphasis on 
governance and the role of lead firms as the organisational drivers of chains has 
often led to the exclusion of the broader political economy context, including 
consideration of the international ‘institutional framework’ or ‘rules of the game’ 
that bear on chains’ organisation and operation9 (Bair 2008: 4; Palpacuer 2008: 
410-413). Finally, the gendered implications of commodity chain dynamics, 
particularly in the geography and configuration of chains, is also largely absent 
from the extant GCC literature in a context where the garment industry is 
dominated by female labour (Bair 2005: 175). 
The thesis problematises both the GCC framework and the Better Work program. It 
does so in order to raise questions regarding the dominant trajectory of policy 
development since the 1970s, and the development paradigm reflected and 
reproduced within that trajectory (Bair 2007: 488; Sheldon & Quinlan 2011: 24). 
                                                          
9 In line with the thesis’s holistic approach, the term ‘governance’ is used throughout to refer to the 
regulatory mechanisms and institutional arrangements which bear on commodity chains’ 
organisation and incentive structures, such as labour regulations and trade rules (Bair 2005: 168). 
This is in addition to lead firms’ coordinating activities (in the traditional GCC sense). 
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Following this introduction, the thesis unfolds over four substantive chapters 
followed by a brief conclusion. Chapter One provides a constructive but critical 
engagement with the GCC framework.  It draws upon critical GCC scholarship in 
conjunction with Marxist and feminist literatures and establishes the theoretical 
framework of the thesis. The chapter argues that GCCs should be understood as 
historically contingent and politically constructed social relations between 
concrete actors (Bair 2009: 17-19). It contends that foregrounding the gendered 
roles of labour and national and international state institutions10 in the structural 
composition and power dynamics of contemporary commodity chains facilitates a 
deeper understanding of global industries ‘below’ and ‘above’ the level of the firm. 
The chapter concludes that the contemporary garment commodity chain’s 
organisation and power relations severely constrain the possibilities for ‘social 
upgrading’, meaning progressive and sustainable improvements in the wages and 
working conditions of workers at the bottom of the chain. 
Chapter Two builds on these insights and applies the theoretical framework to the 
recent history of the international labour standards regime, which is ostensibly 
designed to address poor wages and working conditions. It also casts the 
theoretical lens on the international trade regime and the garment industry. The 
chapter focuses on developments between the 1970s and early 2000s in order to 
contextualise the emergence of Better Work. This period saw the advent of 
contemporary ‘globalisation’ processes and involved a restructuring of production 
in the global economy. The chapter argues that the emergence and ascendance of 
‘neoliberal’11 policy discourses in this context have posed challenges for the ILO’s 
traditional tripartite model of labour governance, given that they emphasise a 
reorganisation of state regulation in order to enhance opportunities for capital 
accumulation. The chapter thus centres on the resulting contestation surrounding 
                                                          
10 This thesis uses the term ‘state’ to refer to national state institutions such as governments and 
security forces. It uses the term ‘international institution’ to refer to agencies comprising the 
international governance framework of the United Nations (UN). These include the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The World 
Trade Organisation, while not strictly a UN agency, is also considered part of this framework. 
11 This thesis acknowledges that the meaning and implications of the term ‘neoliberal’ are 
contested, and treats these policy discourses as subject to ongoing processes of contestation. 
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‘public’ versus ‘private’12 labour governance and the role of worker protections in 
development and trade. It concludes that new forms of labour governance, 
exemplified in Better Work, have emerged from and are reflective of struggles 
between capital, the state and labour. These struggles have gendered implications, 
given that women comprise the majority of the global labour force and are 
disproportionately concentrated in lower-paid, informal13 and ‘flexibilised’ jobs, 
including those that predominate at the bottom of GCCs. 
Chapter Three shifts to the focused empirical examination of Better Factories 
Cambodia (BFC), being the ILO’s flagship labour standards program. It emerged 
out of a bilateral trade agreement with the US and was the first instance of ILO 
factory monitoring. The chapter argues that BFC’s emergence and early successes 
were contingent upon unique political-economic conditions which began to change 
after the expiration of the trade agreement in 2004. It examines the significance of 
Cambodia’s garment industry to the wider economy and highlights the gendered 
nature of its workforce. The chapter suggests that the reputational advantage 
promised by BFC does not compensate for the Cambodian garment industry’s lack 
of competitiveness in terms of prices, lead times and quality. It also argues that 
Cambodia’s ‘ethical’ reputation is under threat, due to the persistence of poor 
labour standards, threats to workers’ rights, industrial disputes and state 
corruption. The chapter concludes that Cambodia’s experience raises serious 
doubts regarding the long-term viability of the Better Work model of labour 
governance. 
Chapter Four considers evidence from several other Better Work country 
programs in order to illustrate that the program’s lack of success is not isolated to 
Cambodia. The chapter then turns to a critical analysis of the deeper contradictions 
of the Better Work model of labour governance. It argues that the BFC program’s 
                                                          
12 ‘Public’ refers here to state-led regulation whereas ‘private’ refers primarily to self-regulation by 
firms, but can include a variety of civil society actors such as NGOs. 
13
 ‘Informal’ economic activities contribute to a country’s economy but are unrecognised, 
unrecorded, unprotected or unregulated by public authorities and thus informal in areas such as 
registration, tax payments, operating licences and conditions of employment in an environment 
where similar activities are formalised (Becker 2004: 8; Castells & Portes 1989: 11-12). The 
informal economy does not include either the criminal economy or the ‘care’ economy 
characterised by unpaid domestic labour (Becker 2004: 11; Castells & Portes 1989: 12). 
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well-documented ‘procedural issues’ should not be interpreted as remediable 
design flaws. Rather, they are rooted in the ILO’s problematic mediation of the 
contradictions between capital, the state and labour. The chapter argues that the 
program thus reproduces the social relations and conditions of production it is 
notionally designed to address. It concludes that Better Work fails to disrupt 
deeply embedded structures of inequality in the garment industry and global 
political economy, and ultimately reinforces the power of large buyers and 
powerful states to the detriment of garment workers. 
The thesis concludes with a reflection on two broader implications of Better 
Work’s institutionalisation. First, Better Work replaces a ‘regulatory vacuum’ with 
a ‘regulatory conundrum’, creating a façade of improved labour governance that 
potentially undermines more promising avenues of progress. Second, Better Work 
disempowers workers and delegitimises their independent collective actions, 
given that they threaten the ‘ethical’ reputation the program seeks to promote. The 
chapter suggests that Better Work reflects one particular configuration of capital-
state-labour relations. Given the historical contingency of compromises between 
these actors, future developments and reconfigurations in labour governance 
should be continually problematised from a gender-sensitive perspective that 
accounts for the role of labour and international institutions in the global political 
economy.  
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Chapter One 
Developing the Global Commodity 
Chains Framework 
The global commodity chains (GCC) framework offers valuable insights into the 
ways in which people, places and processes are linked to each other in the global 
economy, including the full range of activities that firms and workers perform to 
produce and distribute a specific product (Bair 2009: 1; Gereffi 2013: 4). As Selwyn 
(2012: 209) suggests, ‘identifying these processes contributes to a greater 
comprehension of the reasons for the reproduction of the north-south divide and 
illustrates the intensely competitive and unequal nature of the world economy.’ 
This chapter offers a critical but constructive engagement with this GCC 
framework. It draws upon critical GCC scholarship in conjunction with Marxist and 
feminist literatures, and forms the conceptual basis for the thesis. 
The conceptual development of the GCC framework unfolds over two sections. The 
first section traces the intellectual origins of the GCC framework and its 
interdisciplinary pedigree. Drawing on Marxist and critical GCC scholarship, it 
outlines the limitations of the framework’s core methodological concepts of value, 
governance and upgrading. It then reformulates the concepts in order to 
foreground the labour process and state institutions. The second section builds on 
these insights and extends the GCC framework’s conceptual basis through an 
engagement with Marxist and feminist literatures. It argues that GCCs are 
historically contingent and politically constructed social relations between 
concrete actors (Bair 2009: 17-19). It identifies three aspects of these contingent 
social relations – gender, workers and the labour process, and national and 
international state institutions – that are currently under-theorised in GCC 
research. It contends that foregrounding these social relations in the structural 
composition and power dynamics of contemporary commodity chains facilitates a 
deeper understanding of global industries ‘below’ and ‘above’ the level of the firm. 
The chapter concludes that developing the GCC framework beyond its capital-
10 
 
centric and gender-neutral limitations allows this thesis to capture important 
dimensions of the contemporary garment commodity chain that are currently 
under-developed in GCC research. 
The global commodity chains framework 
The term ‘commodity chain’ was first coined by Hopkins and Wallerstein in 1977 
and developed throughout the 1980s by world systems theorists (Bair 2005: 155). 
Over the past two decades a number of closely related frameworks have emerged 
which apply the concept of global chains or networks to the study of global 
industries (Bair 2005: 162-164; Henderson et al. 2002: 438). Three sets of 
terminology have become especially prominent (Coe et al. 2008: 272). These are 
global commodity chains (GCC; see Gereffi 1994 for the key initial contribution), 
global value chains (GVC; Gereffi et al. 2005), and global production networks 
(GPN; Henderson et al. 2002). GCC/GVC/GPN analyses are broadly situated within 
a variety of interdisciplinary research agendas, including new economic sociology, 
Marxist geography, development studies, new international labour studies, and 
industrial relations studies. While the terms are often used interchangeably,14 each 
of these chain/network constructs has particular theoretical implications, 
substantive emphases and empirical concerns (Bair 2009: 2).15 
In the earliest formulation of the GCC concept, Gereffi (1994) argues that GCCs 
have three main dimensions. First, GCCs have a specific input-output structure, 
which links various nodes of production, distribution, and consumption into a 
chain of economic activity in which value is produced. Second, GCCs have a 
territoriality in the sense that the various activities, nodes, and flows within a 
chain are geographically situated, with implications for levels and processes of 
development depending upon the position of firms and localities within a chain. 
                                                          
14
 Given such complexity, this project will retain the terms GCC and commodity chain throughout 
for purposes of clarity and in order to position this thesis within the critical GCC research agendas 
of scholars such as Bair, Palpacuer and Selwyn, while deriving insights from the GPN and GVC 
frameworks. 
15 GPN researchers seek to overcome the perceived linearity and market reification of much GCC 
analysis by incorporating ‘all kinds of network configuration’ and ‘all relevant sets of actors and 
relationships’ (Coe et al. 2008: 272). GVC researchers have shifted away from a holistic GCC view of 
global processes and their social consequences in pursuit of more sophisticated and performance-
focussed firm-level economic modelling (Palpacuer 2008: 394).  
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Finally, GCCs have a governance structure comprised of ‘authority and power 
relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are 
allocated and flow within a chain’ (Gereffi 1994: 96-97; Smith et al. 2002: 44). This 
contribution constituted an extension and reformulation of Wallerstein’s world 
systems theory and Schumpeter’s conceptualisation of capitalist innovation 
(Selwyn 2012: 207). Selwyn (2012: 209) argues that world systems theory’s 
conception of the way developed countries concentrate higher value-adding 
activities within their borders complements neatly the Schumpeterian emphasis 
on how entrepreneurial rents are purposefully generated by firms and states. 
These rents are held to yield super-profits which enable leading firms to invest 
more intensely in innovations and maintain their dominant position in the chain 
(Selwyn 2012: 209). 
Conceptual limitations 
Although GCC research is diverse and interdisciplinary, three particular notions 
form a common conceptual basis for the framework – value, governance, and 
upgrading. While these concepts capture important phenomena in the 
contemporary global economy, their capital-centric assumptions and limitations 
have particular implications for GCC analyses. The processes of producing, 
enhancing, distributing and realising ‘value’ are central to GCC analyses, and this 
focus on value enables an understanding of economic activity and firms as 
‘embedded’ in a context of social relations (Smith et al. 2002: 55). The organisation 
of value flows within commodity chains, and the various forces that impinge upon 
the process – including state action, labour organisation, and corporate practices – 
are seen as fundamental by GCC researchers to understanding of economic 
activities and changing territorial divisions of labour (Smith et al. 2002: 42-43).  
A focus on flows of value and the differential power and position of economic 
actors in the governance of these flows enables investigation into which actors and 
which places benefit or lose out from such flows (Smith et al. 2002: 54). However, 
the measurement of such value and value transformations is a persistent challenge 
in complex commodity chains (Coe 2011: 396). The notion of value is usually 
understood within GCC research to refer to various forms of economic rent that 
12 
 
can be realised through markets, as well as non-market transactions within 
commodity chains (Coe 2011: 396). This approach ‘explains the distribution of 
wealth within a chain as an outcome of the relative intensity of competition within 
different nodes’ (Gereffi 1994: 4). 
The GCC framework’s  rent-based conceptualisation of value emphasises inter-firm 
relations and technological innovation, resulting in a top-down ‘network 
essentialism’ whereby the dynamics of GCCs are seen to ‘flow from the functional 
characteristics of the governance networks that constitute them’ (Taylor 2007: 
534). Despite this capital-centric orientation, GCC research tends to view the firm 
itself as a ‘black box’ (Coe et al. 2008: 284). This results in a focus on flows of 
commodities and values already produced and a foregrounding of trading activities 
in the market over labouring activities in the production process (Smith et al. 
2002: 55). Labour is handled as ‘a static factor of production’, often with the 
implicit assumption of the availability of cheap and/or disciplined labour power 
(Taylor 2007: 535). This neglects consideration of the social processes that 
construct and reproduce labour power in the form of a commodity with particular 
attributes in specific locations (Taylor 2007: 535).  
Therefore, production is understood here as a ‘social’ rather than ‘technical’ 
process, which is embedded within dynamics of power and a continuous cycle of 
resistance and accommodation by workers in the new global factories (Munck 
2009: 617). Focussing on the contradictory and contested nature of the labour 
process facilitates a more coherent conceptualisation of how value is created by 
labour before its realisation through the market (Smith et al. 2002: 55). Workers’ 
lives and livelihoods are further emphasised through a broad understanding of 
value or ‘wealth’ as encompassing ‘wellbeing’ rather than simply the private 
possession of economic value (Palpacuer 2008: 394). 
GCC research analyses flows of value from two contrasting vantage points – top-
down and bottom-up (Gereffi 2013: 4). The goal of GCC research is to understand 
the organisation of global industries, including where, how, and by whom value is 
created and distributed along a commodity chain (Bair 2005: 157). Much of the 
extant GCC literature has focussed on the top-down ‘governance structure’ of 
13 
 
commodity chains. Governance describes the process by which particular actors in 
the chain exert control and coordinate the activities of other participants, as well 
as how these powerful firms actively shape the distribution of risks and value 
along the chain (Bair 2008: 4; Gereffi 2013: 5). Special attention is paid to powerful 
‘lead firms’, also known as ‘chain drivers’, because of their influence over other 
chain participants and their presumed importance as potential agents of upgrading 
and development (Bair 2005: 157).  
A well-known distinction in the GCC literature is the one drawn by Gereffi between 
producer-driven (PDCC) and buyer-driven (BDCC) commodity chains (Gereffi 
1994: 96-97). PDCC are characteristic of more capital- and technology-intensive 
industries like motor vehicles and aircraft, in which powerful manufacturers 
control and often own tiers of vertically-organised suppliers (Gereffi 1994: 97). 
BDCC are typically labour-intensive light-manufacturing industries such as 
garments and footwear, wherein subcontracting networks are managed by 
designers, retailers and other brand-name firms that design and market, but do not 
necessarily manufacture, the products sold under their brand (Gereffi 1994: 97-
99). The garment industry is a prototypical BDCC because ‘it generates a highly 
aggressive pattern of global sourcing through a variety of organisational channels,’ 
including giant cost-driven discount chains, upscale branded marketers, specialty 
stores, and private label programs among mass merchandise retailers (Gereffi 
1999: 40). 
The tendency to emphasise governance in GCC analyses is intended to show that 
contemporary globalisation entails new forms of coordination and control, which 
in turn affect the composition, organisation and geography of various economic 
activities (Bair 2005: 173). The applicability and utility of the PDCC/BDCC 
dichotomy has been disputed and alternative typologies proposed.16 However, Bair 
(2005: 159) suggests that it remains significant for its theorisation of commercial 
capital or ‘big buyers’ as the power brokers that direct the activities of other firms 
in BDCCs even though they may have no equity relation to the firms actually 
                                                          
16 For example, in order to address concerns that the PDCC/BDCC typology is too broad to capture 
the full complexity of chain governance structures, the GVC framework employs a five-fold typology 
of market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchical value chains (Gereffi 2013: 5-6). 
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producing the goods made on their behalf. Chains with more ‘market-like’ 
governance structures still require coordination, and lead firms typically assume 
these tasks given that they determine much of the division of labour along the 
chain and define the terms on which actors gain access to it (Bair 2009: 20). 
Buyers’ coordinating behaviours, including funding strategies, sourcing practices 
and design requirements, strongly influence outcomes for supplier firms (Bair 
2009: 20). Research on the governance structure of BDCCs is particularly salient in 
the context of export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) strategies in developing 
countries (Gereffi 2013: 3). EOI strategies frequently encourage specialisation in 
the kind of labour-intensive light manufacturing industries associated with BDCCs 
such as the garment industry (Bair 2005: 160; Bonacich et al. 1994: 6-8). 
However, the GCC framework’s emphasis on governance and the role of lead firms 
as the organisational drivers of chains has often led to the exclusion of the broader 
political economy context, including consideration of the international 
‘institutional framework’ or ‘rules of the game’ that bear on chains’ organisation 
and operation17 (Bair 2008: 4; Palpacuer 2008: 410-413). GCC analyses tend to 
identify the strongest lead firm in the system, and then explain the nature of the 
system in relation to that dominance without adequately explaining how that 
dominance is produced and contested (Coe 2011: 394; Starosta 2010: 439-441). 
Strong emphasis has also been placed on technical and economic aspects of 
governance, overlooking changes of a more political nature in value allocation 
across the chain (Palpacuer 2008: 399).  
The multiple governance structures that link the different components of the 
system together warrant closer attention – domestic and international, public and 
private, chain-based and civic (Gereffi 2013: 21). Rather than seeing the global 
economy as an autonomous entity that shapes the social world around itself, it is 
thus important to investigate the social foundations and social relations upon 
which the global economy is constructed and which shape its dynamics (Taylor 
2008: 18). ‘Embedded’ social relations cannot be understood as self-subsistent 
                                                          
17 In line with the thesis’s holistic approach, the term ‘governance’ is used throughout to refer to the 
regulatory mechanisms and institutional arrangements which bear on commodity chains’ 
organisation and incentive structures, such as labour regulations and trade rules (Bair 2005: 168). 
This is in addition to lead firms’ coordinating activities (in the traditional GCC sense). 
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constellations but as moments in a circuit of capital spanning production and 
circulation (Starosta 2010: 441; Taylor 2007: 536). In this way, the struggles that 
surround embedded production may be understood to have reciprocal effects 
upon the wider terrain of global capital accumulation (Taylor 2007: 535). 
The policy orientation of GCC research is most evident in the bottom-up concept of 
‘upgrading’, which refers to the process by which economic actors (principally 
supplier firms) seek to maintain or improve their position in the commodity chain 
in order to increase the benefits that they receive from participating in it (Bair 
2008: 5). The ability or inability of countries and firms to upgrade in various ways 
has been the focal point of numerous GCC studies, as researchers often emphasise 
the connection between chain participation and development strategies and the 
numerous factors that impinge upon the process (Barrientos et al. 2011: 325; 
Gereffi 2013: 11). The original formulation of the upgrading concept focussed 
exclusively on enhancing firm-level competitiveness and ‘moving up the chain’ in 
order to generate and retain more value (Gibbon 2008: 44).  
As a reaction to the limitations of this conceptualisation, GCC scholars have 
recently proposed that greater firm-level competitiveness and profitability be 
termed ‘economic upgrading,’ whilst the betterment of workers’ conditions and 
remuneration be referred to as ‘social upgrading’ (Selwyn 2012: 79). The links 
between the two are complex and empirical studies demonstrate that economic 
upgrading does not necessarily lead to social upgrading, given that supplier firms 
must balance competing pressures to maximise quality in order to meet buyers’ 
standards while minimising costs in order to remain competitive (Barrientos et al. 
2011: 332-333). 
Economic and social upgrading are typically analysed through stylised 
typographies, although social upgrading is a newer concept and has been less 
systematically theorised than economic upgrading (Selwyn 2012: 206). Economic 
upgrading is delineated through a fourfold typology, with each type embodying a 
capital dimension (the use of new machinery or advanced technology) and a 
labour dimension (skill or productivity development) (Barrientos et al. 2011: 323; 
Coe 2011: 396; Gibbon 2008: 44). ‘Process upgrading’ involves making the 
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production process more efficient, including through mechanisation; ‘product 
upgrading’ involves introducing more sophisticated product types; ‘functional 
upgrading’ involves moving to higher value-added tasks; and ‘chain upgrading’ 
involves shifting to a more technologically advanced commodity chain in a new, 
but often related, industry or end market (Barrientos et al. 2011: 323-324; Gereffi 
2013: 11).  
Social upgrading is generally divided into two components, ‘measurable labour 
standards’ and ‘enabling workers’ rights’ (Anner 2012: 610; Barrientos et al. 2011: 
324). ‘Labour standards’ are minimum acceptable conditions in areas such as 
wages, working hours, and occupational health and safety. Such standards are 
more readily observable and quantifiable, and are modifiable through stakeholder 
negotiations and government policy (Anner 2012: 610; Barrientos et al. 2011: 324-
325). ‘Workers’ rights’ guarantee enabling procedures that mitigate the inherent 
power imbalance of the employment relationship but do not dictate outcomes and 
are less easily quantified (Barrientos et al. 2011: 324-325; Anner 2012: 610). 
These include freedom of association (i.e. the right to form a union), the right to 
bargain collectively, and the right to withhold one’s labour to improve working 
conditions (Barrientos et al. 2011: 325; Anner 2012: 610). Lack of access to 
enabling rights undermines workers’ ability to negotiate improvements in their 
labour standards (Barrientos et al. 2011: 325). It is hoped that benefits of social 
upgrading may accrue not just to direct employees, but also spread to their 
families and communities (Barrientos et al. 2011: 324). 
These stylised typographies and trajectories of upgrading offer limited insights 
compared to case-based analyses that combine attention to specific characteristics 
of a local or national industry and its evolution over time, with an understanding of 
where these locations fit in the macro context of the global garment industry (Bair 
2008: 9; Gibbon 2008: 44-46). The economic upgrading concept offers little 
theoretical conception of how firm-level upgrading can be achieved through the 
worsening of workers’ conditions within and beyond the workplace (Goto 2011: 
945; Selwyn 2013: 76). Selwyn (2013: 75) argues that the social upgrading 
represents an ‘elite comprehension of relations between capital, the state and 
labour’. It assumes mutually beneficial relations between capital and labour while 
17 
 
denying the reality of labour’s exploitation by capital through the labour process 
(Selwyn 2013: 82). However, a vast and growing literature has demonstrated that 
firms that participate successfully in global chains may not deliver benefits to 
workers in the form of higher wages, greater job security, or improved working 
conditions. More serious attention must be paid to production and its broader 
political economy context, in order to examine the creation of value during the 
labour process and how value is subsequently distributed along the chain (Bair 
2005: 166-167; Palpacuer 2008: 398-402). 
Beyond capital-centrism: gendered labour and international state 
institutions in the garment commodity chain 
Historical and comparative studies have demonstrated the importance of 
approaching GCCs as both historically contingent and politically constructed social 
relations between concrete actors (Bair 2009: 17-19). The extant GCC literature is 
often capital-centric and gender-neutral, offering limited insights into how chains 
are ‘articulated within and through the larger social, cultural and political-
economic environments in which they operate’ (Bair 2005: 167-168). However, 
understanding the ways in which social relations co-determine processes of 
capitalist development and change helps to capture important dimensions of the 
contemporary garment commodity chain that are currently under-theorised in 
GCC research (Selwyn 2012: 222). This approach does not just ‘bring back in’ or 
‘add on’ additional areas of investigation for GCC analysis, but potentially 
represents a fundamental re-orientation of the approach (Selwyn 2012: 222; 
Taylor 2009: 437). Foregrounding the gendered positions of labour and state 
institutions in the structural composition and power dynamics of contemporary 
commodity chains therefore facilitates a deeper understanding of global industries 
‘below’ and ‘above’ the level of the firm. 
Gendered labour 
Labour is understood here to be a fundamental component of GCCs. While 
numerous GCC analyses have sought to more adequately incorporate labour, they 
have generally investigated how globalisation impacts on labour and frames 
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workers as largely passive ‘victims’ of these processes (Selwyn 2012: 205-206). 
This provides only a partial view of wider social relations and institutional 
contexts in the constitution and reworking of flows of value between economic 
actors and across space, which shape production and mediate its developmental 
impacts (Selwyn 2013: 77; Smith et al. 2002: 55; Taylor 2007: 534). It also 
marginalises important questions about power and subjectivity both within the 
labour process and within the wider context of the specific social relations through 
which local and national labour forces are produced, reproduced, and deployed to 
create value within the production process (Taylor 2007: 535). Smith et al. (2002: 
47–48) thus argue that there is a ‘need for a more systematic analysis of the 
relations between capital, the state and labour in the production, circulation and 
realisation of commodities’ within commodity chains.  
The capitalist labour process exists within two sets of mutually conditioning 
relations – competition between firms and the employment of wage labour by 
capital (Selwyn 2013: 82). It consists of two sub-processes – first, the production 
of use and exchange values, and simultaneously, the generation of surplus value 
(Selwyn 2013: 82). Because firms relate to each other through constant 
competition, the labour process is ‘characterised by an endless productivity drive 
designed to maximise the speed and intensity of the performance of tasks and the 
precision, predictability and quality of transformations being worked’ (Selwyn 
2013: 82). However, labour power is ‘indeterminate’ in that there is often a 
disjuncture between the expectations of managers and of workers regarding what 
needs to be done, how that work is to be performed, and how quickly it must be 
completed.  Cumbers et al. (2008: 370) argue that the ‘labour problem’ is threefold, 
involving 
‘first, the need to successfully incorporate labour into the production 
process; second, the need to exercise control over labour time in the 
production process and third… the imperative to exploit labour as part of 
the process of commodification to realise surplus value.’  
In other words, ‘capital comes up against the reality of labour agency and 
resistance’ (Cumbers et al. 2008: 370).  
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Workers are understood here to have both structural and associational power. 
Structural power accrues to workers on the basis of their position in the 
production process and their ability to disrupt it, whereas associational power 
comprises ‘the various forms of power that result from the collective organisation 
of workers’ (Wright 2000: 962). Whether or not workers’ structural power is 
exercised in order to achieve concessions from capital depends on the politics of 
their organisations (Arnold 2013: 3-4; Selwyn 2013: 78). The GCC framework’s 
‘social upgrading’ concept represents a ‘top-down’ approach to addressing labour’s 
maltreatment by capital, wherein trade unions that complement capital’s 
objectives of profit maximisation, through facilitating the regulation of relations 
between employers and workers, are conceived of as ‘market-friendly’ actors 
(Selwyn 2013: 81). As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, states and 
employers in garment-manufacturing countries have sought to influence and 
control workers’ organisations while engaging in repressive actions against 
independent workers’ unions. These actions have significant chilling effects18 upon 
workers’ exercising of their associational and collective bargaining rights. 
The alternative, critical GCC framework developed here represents a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to these issues rooted in an analysis of the labour process and an 
emphasis on contestation and contradiction within that process (Selwyn 2013: 
88). The top-down perspective allocates labour a subordinate ‘partnership’ role to 
firms’ capital accumulation imperatives and states’ attempts at regulating the 
capital-labour relation, assuming mutual gains for capital and labour (Selwyn 
2013: 88). In contrast, the bottom-up perspective analytically prioritises workers’ 
struggles to ameliorate their conditions through genuine and independent 
(meaning free from state and employer influence) collective action (Selwyn 2013: 
88). If workers are able to organise in the face of capitalist management systems 
designed to raise the rate of exploitation, then they significantly raise the 
possibilities of achieving some form of social upgrading (Selwyn 2013: 84). 
However, the gendered character of labour also bears on these processes of 
contestation (Rai 2004; 582-583; Seguino 2003: 3). 
                                                          
18 The term ‘chilling effect’ describes the inhibition or discouragement of the legitimate exercise of a 
legal and/or human right, due to potential or threatened prosecution (Merk 2012: 16). 
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Understanding how gender pervades the social construction and utilisation of 
workforces within commodity chains is therefore critical to grasping their 
complexities (Taylor 2009: 442). Women comprise the majority of the global 
labour force, and the past several decades have witnessed their increasing 
integration into the labour market and capitalist system, particularly within the 
export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) development processes in the global South 
which typify GCCs (Beneria 2003: 77-78; Christian et al. 2013: 2; Elson 1999: 615; 
Kaur 2004: 37-38). There are a multitude of reasons behind the relationship 
between labour intensity and women’s employment. In simple terms, labour-
intensive sectors are more likely to hire women as a result of women’s lower 
average wages, the higher level of turnover in such industries, and gendered 
discourses of work (Caraway 2007: 60; Christian et al. 2013: 3-5). Women’s 
employment in export-oriented manufacturing has been a particularly important 
source of foreign exchange for many countries throughout the developing world, in 
some cases (notably Cambodia) becoming the most important part of their 
economy (Bahramitash 2005: 46).  
However, garment factory jobs typically offer little prospect for advancement or 
skills enhancement, are characterised by poor working conditions, and in many 
cases the gains of such employment have been offset by rising inflation and a drop 
in the real income of low-income families in particular (Bahramitash 2005: 46-48; 
Beneria 2003: 77-78; Christian et al. 2013: 5; Elson 1999: 618; Gimenez 2005: 21-
24; Pearson 2003: 29). While in the 1980s the experiences of young female 
workers were often simplistically understood in terms of their ‘victimisation’ and 
‘proletarianisation’, their ‘nimble fingers’ and docility providing attractive 
incentives for exploitative transnational corporations (TNCs) to mobilise their 
labour, the debate has since matured (Beneria 2003: 78; Caraway 2005: 400-401; 
Ruwanpura 2011: 199-200). Feminists are now contributing to a more nuanced 
awareness of how these changes generate both opportunities and challenges for 
women, their families, and their communities, including how women are exercising 
their agency in order to negotiate the competing demands on their time (Beneria 
2003: 78; Christian et al. 2013: 5-6; Kaur 2004: 38). 
21 
 
Women’s participation in the labour market can enhance their autonomy and 
weaken traditional forms of gender inequality (Elson 1999: 614-616). However, 
they often end up shouldering a double burden of primary responsibility for their 
family’s reproduction through both paid work and unpaid domestic labour 
(Beneria 2003: 77-78; Gimenez 2005: 21). Gendered outcomes in the labour 
market are not simply a function of women’s role in the family (Caraway 2007: 
60). Instead, ‘gender, as a set of context-specific meanings and practices, intersects 
the structure of global capitalism and its systemic logic of value extraction and 
capital accumulation’ (Bair 2010: 205; emphasis added). Gender norms and 
practices thus comprise part of the wider institutional context within which GCCs 
are embedded and affect the commercial dynamics of commodity chains at every 
stage (Christian et al. 2013: 2; Rai 2004: 591). 
Gendered institutions 
The institutional analysis adopted here views individual action as embedded in 
collective dynamics within which norms and rules are developed and sustained in 
society, including the economy (Palpacuer 2008: 410). Institutional dynamics 
shape the opportunities and constraints faced by individuals and have the capacity 
to generate inequalities in access to resources such as education and well-paid jobs 
in the labour market (Palpacuer 2008: 411; Rai 2004: 583). GCCs are embedded in 
various kinds of regulation, and a clearer understanding of the role of national and 
international institutions in governing chains is crucial to understanding how their 
‘vertical’ dimensions intersect with their ‘horizontal’ embeddedness in particular 
places and localities (Coe 2011: 393; Gibbon 2008: 46). Institutional changes that 
occur ‘above’ GCCs have deep consequences in terms of the distribution of power, 
risks and wealth among firms, workers and communities across the chain (Gibbon 
2008: 41; Palpacuer 2008: 395).  
The institutional forms of the state, including international institutions, are thus 
the constant target of struggles that aim to redefine the social context of 
production (Taylor 2007: 538). Without arrangements that commit capital to 
providing benefits to labour, there is no reason why individual firms would choose 
to do so (even if they wanted to) as their actions would represent a cost, thus 
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potentially diminishing their competitive advantage (Selwyn 2013: 83). However, 
what the social upgrading concept and programs like Better Work often ignore is 
that ‘such institutional arrangements are often outcomes of and/or responses to 
real or potential struggles between capital and labour’ (Selwyn 2013: 83; emphasis 
added). International institutions are not neutral bodies as they play an important 
role in reproducing and legitimating the status quo, including gender norms, while 
absorbing counter-hegemonic ideas (Rai 2004: 581-582; Soederberg 2007: 509).  
As will be further explored in the next chapter, the international governance of 
labour standards and trade issues has remained relatively distinct, at least at the 
formal level of public regulatory institutions, thanks to the establishment of 
separate international organisations in the early 20th century. The international 
labour standards regime has advanced largely under the aegis of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), while the liberalisation of international trade has been 
overseen by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Balaam & Veseth 2008: 108; Helfer 2006: 
720). Both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offer 
conditional financial and technical ‘assistance’ to developing countries, while the 
IMF also oversees the international monetary system and monitors the financial 
and economic policies of its members (IMF 2013; World Bank 2013).  
These international institutions have often worked at cross-purposes. The ILO in 
particular has struggled to fulfil its mandate of promoting labour protections in the 
context of rising capital mobility and an increasingly competitive global trade 
environment, conditions which have been aggressively promoted by the 
GATT/WTO, World Bank and IMF (Berik & Rodgers 2010: 58; Helfer 2006: 706; 
Standing 2008: 363-365). This trade liberalisation agenda necessarily limits the 
efficacy of social upgrading programs like Better Work, which notionally address 
the needs of those hardest hit by political-economic restructuring (Rai 2004: 581; 
Soederberg 2007: 508). Instead, these initiatives legitimise and normalise the 
expropriation of labour while seeking to neutralise and depoliticise struggles tied 
to the deepening and widening forms of inequality both within developing 
countries and between developed and developing countries (Soederberg 2007: 
510). 
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These struggles include deepening and widening forms gender inequality (Seguino 
2003: 25-26). Institutional structures and policies are often considered to be 
‘gender-neutral’, in the sense that they have no special implication for women or 
men or for power relations between them (Pearson 2003: 26). In reality, these 
institutional arrangements are deeply gendered. For example, the ILO’s traditional 
conceptualisation of ‘labour’ is largely based on the experiences of male, full-time, 
unionised employees (Helfer 2006: 705-706). The ILO has thus struggled to adapt 
its model of labour regulation to the realities of many women workers’ 
experiences in informalised and flexibilised job markets (Elias 2003: 294). 
Changing trade rules also mean changes to the structure of incentives and rewards 
for different people, and affect women and men differently (Christian et al. 2013: 4; 
Pearson 2003: 26). Women are therefore disproportionately affected by changes in 
the global trade environment, because of their concentration in export-oriented 
manufacturing (Kaur 2004: 38). 
Conclusion: Social relations and conditions of production 
Developing the GCC framework beyond its capital-centric and gender-neutral 
limitations allows this thesis to capture important dimensions of the contemporary 
garment commodity chain that are currently under-theorised in GCC research. 
Selwyn (2012: 222) suggests that this ‘reformulated research agenda fits into a 
broader framework of progressive social science that places class relations at its 
centre, and seeks to elucidate ways in which labour can ameliorate its position in 
relation to capital. This is because class compromises, alliances and the 
institutionalisation of these relations ultimately emerge out of processes of 
collective action by workers as they pursue their own goals, demonstrating to 
capital their collective strength (Selwyn 2013: 88). However, as the next chapter 
illustrates, the structural dynamics and distribution of power within the 
contemporary garment commodity chain severely constrain the possibilities for 
progressive and sustainable improvements in the wages and working conditions of 
workers at the bottom of the commodity chain. 
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Chapter Two 
The Origins of the Better Work 
Program 
The previous chapter established the conceptual basis of the thesis and argued that 
the structural composition and power dynamics of the garment global commodity 
chain (GCC) severely constrain possibilities for ‘social upgrading’, meaning 
progressive and sustainable improvements in the wages and working conditions of 
workers at the bottom of the chain. This chapter builds on this analysis and 
contextualises Better Work’s emergence within broader shifts occurring over the 
last several decades in the global political economy, including the international 
labour standards regime, the international trade regime, and the garment industry. 
The chapter explores the debates surrounding ‘public’ versus ‘private’ labour 
governance and the role of worker protections in development and trade.  
This historical account unfolds over two chronological sections. The first section 
explores the establishment of separate international labour standards and trade 
regimes during the early 20th century and traces the emergence of the 
contemporary garment commodity chain during the 1970s and 1980s. It highlights 
how the significant restructuring and global spread of the garment industry during 
this period was incentivised under a protectionist quota regime known as the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). It also signals the International Labour 
Organisation’s (ILO) limited capacity to address poor labour standards and threats 
to workers’ rights. The second section analyses the intense period of institutional 
and structural change that occurred during the 1990s-2000s as a result of this 
political-economic restructuring. It analyses the processes of contestation between 
social movements and firms that led to the significant privatisation and 
voluntarisation of labour standards governance. It also examines the legitimisation 
of these transformations at the level of the ILO. The section then studies the 
impacts of the MFA’s phase-out on the garment commodity chain, including 
increasing consolidation of buyers’ sourcing networks and an intensification of 
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competition at the lower ends of the commodity chain. It argues that both of these 
trends have had considerable negative implications for garment workers 
worldwide, putting further downwards pressure on their wages and working 
conditions. The chapter concludes that these developments demonstrate how the 
international labour standards and trade regimes are continually reconfigured in 
order to prioritise the interests of capital over workers. 
Contestation and control: labour standards, trade negotiations 
and the garment industry before the 1990s 
The international governance of labour standards and trade has remained 
relatively distinct, at least at the formal level of public regulatory institutions, 
thanks to the establishment of separate international organisations in the early 
20th century. The international labour standards regime has advanced largely 
under the aegis of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Helfer 2006: 720), 
while the liberalisation of international trade has been overseen by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (Balaam & Veseth 2008: 108). The regulatory arrangements 
established by these organisations are subject to ongoing scrutiny and debate, 
particularly as tensions between developed and developing countries over the 
‘rules of the game’ have intensified with the significant restructuring of the global 
political economy that began in the 1970s and 1980s (Balaam & Veseth 2008: 114-
115).  
The most powerful countries, particularly the US, have typically responded to 
demands for change by arguing that developing countries should become more 
integrated into the global economy rather than trying to change the global system’s 
rules and procedures (Balaam & Veseth 2008: 115). From the 1970s onwards, this 
‘integration’ typically involved the pursuit of export-oriented industrialisation 
(EOI) and involvement in global commodity chains (Gereffi 2013: Ruwanpura 
2011: 198). However, as this section argues, these international labour and trade 
regimes ultimately favoured the capital accumulation imperatives of firms in the 
developed world.  Meanwhile, workers in labour-intensive commodity chains 
around the globe were brought into more intense competition with one another 
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for jobs and faced downwards pressure on their wages, working conditions, and 
union rights (Esbenshade 2008: 455-458; Hale 2000: 350-354). These processes 
were inherently gendered, as increasing numbers of women were ‘pulled onto the 
global assembly line’ (Kaur 2004: 55-57). 
The International Labour Organisation: tripartism and the labourist model 
of workplace regulation 
The ILO was established in 1919 in the wake of World War 1 and the Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia, with the aim of developing and promoting labour standards 
in order to ‘redirect the forward march of the working class’ amidst fears of 
socialist protests (Standing 2008: 356). It was feared that ‘capital has no country,’ 
and the ILO aimed to create a floor under labour conditions which would underpin 
international competition (Murray 2002: 33). The ILO is the only tripartite United 
Nations (UN) agency with government, employer, and worker representatives (ILO 
2013). The ILO’s Conventions are designed to place obligations on states, 
representing benchmarks of strong labour standards towards which national 
governments can strive (Berik & Rodgers 2010: 58; Murray 2002: 33).  
Tripartism is reliant upon strong national governments that are able to create and 
enforce regulations in line with the Conventions, as well as strong unions that have 
the capacity to bargain collectively with employers (Standing 2008: 379). Although 
the ILO’s mandate was to regulate national labour markets in order to give 
protection to workers, within this model workers were conceptualised as male 
‘breadwinners’ in full-time, unionised, formal employment relationships (Helfer 
2006: 705-706). Rather than a universal or citizenship-based system, the ILO was 
thus founded on a gendered ‘labourist’ model of national welfare capitalism in 
which workers’ entitlements are dependent on stable employment and the 
satisfactory performance of labour (Standing 2008: 358). Caraway (2006: 211) 
also suggests that the ILO has historically advanced a distinctly liberal 
interpretation of workers’ rights, with important implications for the creation of 
powerful as opposed to free trade unions. The ILO often makes policy 
recommendations that encourage union competition and discourage centralised 
collective bargaining (Caraway 2006: 211). 
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The ILO’s effectiveness in creating and monitoring international labour standards 
and workers’ rights has fluctuated significantly over its near century of existence, 
and the ILO’s early decades were arguably its most successful (Helfer 2006: 720). 
Since the late 1970s numerous scholars, activists and policy makers have voiced 
concerns about the ILO’s lack of effectiveness in addressing poor labour standards 
and threats to workers’ rights in the context of rising capital mobility and an 
increasingly competitive world trade environment (Berik & Rodgers 2010: 58; 
Helfer 2006: 706). This is partly because the ILO has limited power to enforce its 
Conventions, relying on moral suasion and public embarrassment to bring about 
voluntary compliance by signatory national governments (Berik & Rodgers 2010: 
58). The ILO has also struggled to respond to many challenges to its raison d’etre, 
including the increasing influence of ‘supply-side economics’ in the 1970s, the 
labour flexibility debates of the early 1980s, and restructuring policies such as the 
IMF and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) (Helfer 2006: 706; 
Standing 2008: 363-365).  
The rise of the ‘informal economy’ has also posed a particular intellectual and 
practical challenge, as the labourist model of regulation requires the clear 
identification of employers and employees (Helfer 2006: 706; Standing 2008: 370-
371). Traditional forms of trade union organising based on secure employment are 
difficult in the context of increasingly informalised and dispersed labour forces 
within global commodity chains (GCC) (Hale 2000: 356). The issue of informality 
has never been sufficiently resolved, as confusions surrounding definitions and 
measurement have contributed to the confusion about the appropriate policy 
stance towards it (Standing 2008: 363-364). The ILO has become overstretched in 
response to these changes, trying to play three roles – a standard-setter, a 
technical assistance agency and a knowledge generator – without adequate 
capacity or funding (Standing 2008: 355). 
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The rules of the international trade game: the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), and the 
restructuring of global production 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was the primary organisation 
responsible for the liberalisation of international trade through a series of 
multilateral negotiations, called ‘rounds’,  from 1948 until 1994, when it was 
superseded by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Balaam & Veseth 2008: 108). 
Similar to the ILO, the GATT had no enforcement powers and was instead reliant 
on its members to fulfil their obligations (Balaam & Veseth 2008: 108). The GATT 
was notionally based on the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination, 
meaning that all member nations agreed to lower their trade barriers together in 
order to discourage unilateralism, and to treat imports from all countries the same 
(Balaam & Veseth 2008: 108). However, policy decisions were made on the basis of 
consensus and their implementation often reflected a combination of political and 
economic interests (Balaam & Veseth 2008: 108). This meant that a series of 
exceptions from generalised trade rules were written into the GATT for certain 
goods and services, which were primarily in the protectionist interests of large 
firms in the developed world (Balaam & Veseth 2008: 108). 
The textiles and garment industry was the only major manufacturing industry that 
was not subject to the rules of the GATT from 1961-2004 (Ernst et al. 2005: 1). 
Rather, it was subject to the extensive use of quotas by major importing countries 
in North America and Europe under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA).19 This 
quota regime was notionally intended to protect their domestic industries as the 
labour-intensive nature of textiles and garment production meant that by the mid-
20th century it was becoming relatively easy for developing countries to compete 
(Hale & Shaw 2001: 516-517; Hale & Burns 2005: 211). Garment production is one 
of the oldest and largest export industries in the world (Hale & Shaw 2001: 516-
518). It is generally regarded as a first step for developing countries embarking on 
                                                          
19
 The quota system started in 1961 with the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International 
Trade in Cotton Textiles (STA), which extended in 1962, becoming the Long Term Agreement 
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) (Ernst et al. 2005: 1). In 1974 the LTA was 
superseded by the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which was an expanded regime covering 
materials other than cotton as well as finished garments (Ernst et al. 2005: 1). 
29 
 
an export-oriented industrialisation (EOI)20 process while offering a potential 
gateway to export diversification (Bonacich et al. 1994: 13-15; Gereffi 1999: 40). In 
most developed countries of today and newly industrialised economies in East 
Asia, the garment and textile sector was central in the industrialisation process21 
(Staritz 2010: 1). Given its low entry barriers (low fixed costs and relatively simple 
technology) and its labour-intensive nature, the garment sector absorbed large 
numbers of unskilled, mostly female, workers and provided economic upgrading 
opportunities into higher value-added activities (Hale & Shaw 2001: 518; Staritz 
2010: 1). 
The MFA’s stated purpose was to promote the expansion and progressive 
liberalisation of trade in textile products while avoiding ‘disruptive effects’ in 
individual markets and lines of production (Ernst et al. 2005: 1). However, the 
MFA regime is better understood within the context of a broader effort to kick-
start global accumulation during the 1960s and 1970s, as capital sought to lower 
production costs by evading unions and labour regulations while intensifying 
competition between large numbers of small production units (Bonacich et al. 
1994: 13-15; Eisenstein 2005: 489-490; Esbenshade 2008: 458). Importing 
countries’ domestic interests were crucial in determining which countries 
benefited. Strict quotas were established on imports from strong producers such 
as China, India and Hong Kong, in order to prevent them from establishing trade 
advantages over the US and Europe (Hale & Burns 2005: 211). Fewer restrictions 
were applied to poorer countries, in order to strengthen their ties with the 
capitalist world economy and weaken the appeal of communism (Hale & Burns 
2005: 211; Scheuerman 2001: 372). 
Since the early 1970s US trade policy has also eased access to US markets for 
particular items from certain countries through both the MFA and its Generalised 
                                                          
20 From the 1970s until the 1990s, export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) was encouraged by the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) through Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAP) (Eisenstein 2005: 492-494). SAPs involved market-oriented reforms such as trade and 
investment liberalisation, privatisation of state-owned services, and low levels of taxation 
(Soederberg 2007: 501). 
21
 Developed countries that historically specialised in garment and textiles include the UK, US, 
Germany and Japan. NIEs include China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea. More recent cases 
are Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, China, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Mauritius. 
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System of Preferences (GSP) (Bonacich & Waller 1994: 86-89). The GSP provides 
tariff preferences on the condition that beneficiary countries ‘take steps’ to achieve 
internationally recognised workers’ rights enshrined in ILO Conventions (Caraway 
2010: 233-234; Wells 2006: 359). By the mid-1980s, trade rules were re-imagined 
by US policy-makers as a form of development aid which could provide incentives 
for large firms to invest in the country’s allies, facilitating those developing 
countries’ efforts to liberalise their economies while lowering prices on imported 
goods for US consumers (Bonacich & Waller 1994: 88-89; Seidman 2009: 583-
584). Through the implementation of bilateral and regional trade agreements 
which increased the attractiveness of particular locations as export platforms, the 
US government was able to establish its own rules in order to institutionalise their 
control and shape the geographical location of the garment industry (Bair 2008: 7; 
Hale & Burns 2005: 217). 
The evolution of the garment commodity chain: triangular manufacturing 
and the so-called ‘race to the bottom’ 
Regulatory mechanisms and institutional arrangements, particularly trade policies, 
shape the geography and configuration of global commodity chains and the extent 
to which developing country exporters in particular benefit from their 
participation in the chain (Bair 2005: 168).  The MFA regime and importing 
countries’ trade policies had many shaping effects on the global garment industry, 
and were driving forces behind the significant restructuring and geographical 
spread of the industry that began in the 1970s and continues today (Hale & Burns 
2005: 214). The MFA did not actually ‘protect’ developed countries’ garment 
manufacturing industries. Instead, the regime created incentives to spread 
production across a range of countries (Bonacich et al. 1994: 8-12; Palpacuer 
2008: 411). Large garment brands and retailers were encouraged to lower 
production costs by sourcing from countries around the globe with unused quota, 
lower wages and weaker labour protections, rather than manufacturing at home 
(Esbenshade 2008: 458; Natsuda et al. 2010: 470; Seidman 2009: 583).  
The MFA also contributed directly to increased market concentration and 
increasingly complex global subcontracting networks, because only larger firms 
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were able to manage these processes (Hale & Burns 2005: 214). The most 
powerful firms within the garment industry became large retailers and brands or 
‘buyers’ in the developed world, and large manufacturers who began 
subcontracting production through ‘triangular manufacturing networks’ to 
countries with less stringent quota restrictions and more favoured access to key 
markets in the developed world (Barrientos et al. 2011: 302; Bonacich et al. 1994: 
Gereffi 1999: 39; Hale & Burns 2005: 214-215). Tightly regulated industrial 
relations systems that provided for higher wages and social protections were 
brought into competition with loosely regulated, lower-wage locations in what 
Palpacuer (2008: 411) refers to as a ‘vicious cycle’ of global downward pressure on 
wages and working conditions. In this context, the ILO’s inability to adapt its 
labourist model of regulation to the realities of the global economy meant that it 
was of limited utility to workers at the bottom of the garment commodity chain, 
given the predominately informalised and flexibilised nature of their employment 
in subcontracting production units (Helfer 2006: 705-706; Palpacuer 2008: 411). 
Continuity and change: liberalisation, consolidation and the 
voluntarist turn of the 1990s-2000s 
The complex production networks that developed in the garment industry after 
the 1970s had significant implications for garment workers worldwide. After 
several decades of deteriorating conditions of employment for workers in a 
number of labour-intensive commodity chains, the 1990s ushered in a period of 
renewed interest in the connections between labour standards issues and trade. 
These debates ostensibly focussed on ‘protecting vulnerable workers’ in 
developing countries, and often emphasised the predominance of young, female 
workers in the industry (Elias 2003: 294). However, the reconfigurations that 
emerged in both the international labour standards and trade regimes continued 
to prioritise the capital accumulation imperatives of buyers in the developed world 
(Soederberg 2007: 510). Labour standards governance was significantly privatised 
and voluntarised in the context of the intense promotion of EOI development 
strategies based on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and orders on the 
basis of low labour costs (Elias 2003: 300-301). The garment trade was notionally 
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‘liberalised’ with the expiration of the MFA regime in 2004, which led to further 
consolidation at the top of the commodity chain and an intensification of 
competition for supplier firms and workers at the bottom. It was in the context of 
these contradictory developments that the ILO began to pursue its ‘Better Work’ 
program in Cambodia in 2001. 
Discursive transformations and privatisation: transnational activist 
movements and the shift towards corporate social responsibility 
By the early 1990s, states were increasingly perceived to be ‘weak’ in the face of 
mobile capital, and the logic followed that targeting lead firms would be a more 
beneficial route to improvements (Rai 2004: 584-585). A ‘discursive 
transformation’ began to emerge away from the labourist or  public regulatory 
model, advanced by the ILO, of targeting states to enact and enforce national 
labour laws, in favour of targeting garment buyers to take responsibility for labour 
conditions through private governance initiatives (Mayer & Pickles 2010: 4; 
Murray 2002: 40-41; Seidman 2007: 15). ‘Anti-sweatshop’ campaigns became 
popular after several high-profile US brands – including Nike, the GAP and Liz 
Claiborne – were revealed to be sourcing from ‘sweatshops’22 that consistently 
violated international labour standards and workers’ rights (Mayer & Pickles 
2010: 5-7; Micheletti & Stolle 2007: 163; Ruwanpura 2011: 201). Many lead firms 
began to adopt ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) rhetoric in response, in an 
attempt to insulate themselves from criticism and reputational damage (DeWinter 
2011: 111; Hale & Shaw 2001: 513; Pearson 2007: 732). 
Anti-sweatshop campaigns generally aim to shift the focus of labour struggles from 
local workplace negotiations characterised by major power imbalances between 
workers and employers, towards mobilising consumers around the world to 
‘punish’ or ‘reward’ transnational firms (Anner 2000: 243; Seidman 2007: 17-18). 
This involves urging consumers to consider how their seemingly private 
consumption choices are linked to the rights and conditions of garment workers in 
other countries, while encouraging them to use their power through market-based 
                                                          
22 The term ‘sweatshop’ is an imprecise way to describe subcontracting factories with poor labour 
conditions. It is used here solely in the context of the ‘anti-sweatshop’ movement. 
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strategies such as ‘naming and shaming’ particular firms, boycotts, and the 
purchasing of ‘sweat-free’ goods (Barrientos & Smith 2007: 717; DeWinter 2001: 
112; Micheletti & Stolle 2007: 165). Many firms and certain segments of the anti-
sweatshop movement also support their pursuit of improved working conditions 
through the language of economic efficiency, arguing that healthy workers and safe 
work environments lead to increased productivity and that ‘sweat-free’ goods are 
a response to consumer demands (Arnold & Hartman 2005: 212-213; DeWinter 
2001: 112). However, these campaigns often frame their appeals on behalf of the 
‘voiceless’. This positioning of workers as ‘victims’ of global capitalism can become 
itself a victimising process as instead of insisting on the rights of citizens and 
workers to negotiate on their own behalf, they avoid issues of empowerment and 
emphasise workers’ helplessness and vulnerability (Seidman 2007: 34). 
In this context, Taylor (2011: 449) argues that the CSR paradigm is ‘a sophisticated 
attempt to construct a discourse in which business activities have an ethical core 
that can stand alongside – or even help maximise – the pursuit of profit,’ with the 
potential contradictions between profits and ethics consistently downplayed. 
Scheuerman (2001: 363) further suggests that CSR rhetoric and moves towards 
privatised, ‘self-regulation’ accord well with the ‘reigning neoliberal mood’. They 
allow capital to acknowledge widespread public anxieties about globalisation 
while remaining hostile to traditional forms of state-backed regulation 
(Scheuerman 2001: 363). They also allow states to exhibit similar concern without 
‘invoking the hostility of prospective private investors sensitised to even the 
slightest evidence of a ‘hostile business climate’’ (Scheuerman 2001: 363). 
According to Taylor (2011: 449), this is because 
‘in an era of mounting opposition to neoliberal policies and the social 
dislocations they have wrought, the notion of responsible business has gone 
beyond the level of the individual corporation to become a key ideological 
front in the struggle to maintain or deepen ongoing processes of state 
retrenchment, the reduction of social provision, the flexibilisation of labour 
markets and the reduction of controls on capital mobility.’ 
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In particular, the emphasis on voluntary adherence to CSR initiatives is an attempt 
to undermine calls for a regulated system (Finnegan 2013: 17; Shannon 2010: 33). 
As DeWinter (2001: 111) suggests, one reason that lead firms may be willing to 
incorporate much of the anti-sweatshop movement’s agenda into their bottom line 
is that ‘the rhetoric of large parts of the movement does not contain language that 
challenges capital’s accumulation imperative.’ Voluntary, privatised labour 
standards initiatives are instead positioned as offering a ‘third way’ beyond the 
‘rigidities’ of the traditional interventionist state and the extremes of ‘free market’ 
policies (Scheuerman 2001: 363-364). They act to legitimise and normalise the 
expropriation of labour, while seeking to neutralise and depoliticise struggles tied 
to deepening and widening forms of economic inequality in developing countries 
connected to global commodity chains (Soederberg 2007: 510). 
Public governance responses: the social clause debate in the WTO and the 
ILO’s turn towards core labour standards 
In the context of these discursive shifts in the labour standards debate, various 
scholars, activists, non-governmental organisations (NGO), trade unions and 
policy-makers began to debate whether to incorporate a ‘social clause’ addressing 
labour standards and trade into the WTO’s trade dispute mechanism23 (Alben 
2001: 1416). This clause was to be introduced either through a more expansive 
interpretation of the language contained within the present agreement, or through 
the adoption of explicit language regarding labour standards, and would have been 
linked to the trade dispute mechanism (Alben 2001: 1416). The negotiations 
ultimately failed to reach a consensus due to disagreements regarding the 
implementation of the clause, given the WTO’s mandate of encouraging free trade 
and its lack of expertise in labour rights, especially when compared to the ILO 
(Hensman 2001: 138; Scheuerman 2001: 381). The arguments of both sides were 
also tainted by protectionist motivations, including what Hensman refers to as 
‘labour protectionism’ – that is, the desire to protect employment in one’s own 
country at all costs (Hensman 2001: 123; Scheuerman 2001: 377). It was also 
                                                          
23 Whereas the GATT had no enforcement powers, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Panel (DSP) rules 
on trade disputes and can impose trade sanctions on member states that violate trade agreements. 
Member states submit cases for resolution and can appeal the DSP’s findings (Balaam & Veseth 
2008: 111). 
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feared that the clause was most likely to serve the interests of the most powerful 
developed countries (Scheuerman 2001: 380). 
Following the collapse of the social clause debate in the WTO, the Declaration of 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work was adopted by the ILO in 1998 after 
lengthy and often difficult negotiations. It emerged out of a period of crisis within 
the ILO after the end of the Cold War, as the ILO sought to recapture the ‘moral 
high ground’ on labour standards (Elias 2007: 51; Uvin 2002: 4). The ILO adopted 
the Declaration in order to prioritise a vast array of labour rights; rejuvenate the 
importance and applicability of labour standards in the global economy; and 
resolve tensions between trade and labour, formal and informal employment, and 
ratifying and non-ratifying states (Standing 2008: 366-367). The Declaration is 
unique in that it applies to all ILO member states regardless of whether they have 
ratified the treaties protecting the CLS (Helfer 2006: 709). The Declaration also 
marked a decisive shift in the ILO’s strategies and priorities towards ‘soft law’ and 
promotionalism, with a focus on vague ‘principles’ rather than relatively clearly 
defined ‘rights’ tied to specific Conventions (Alston 2004: 458). 
The Declaration prioritised four ‘core labour standards’ (CLS), which are freedom 
of association and the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of forced and 
compulsory labour; the abolition of child labour; and the elimination of 
discrimination in the workplace (Berik & Rodgers 2010: 58). All four core 
standards are negative (‘freedom from’) rather than positive (‘freedom to’) rights, 
and are process- rather than result-oriented (Alston 2004: 483-486). Given the 
ILO’s liberal interpretation of workers’ rights, labour regulations that limit union 
fragmentation and increase union bargaining power are considered to be 
violations of freedom of association within the Declaration framework (Caraway 
2006: 211). Alston (2004: 458 & 488) contends that a new normative hierarchy 
has been established between core and non-core rights, with the latter becoming 
gradually downgraded and ignored as firms, governments, and other actors are 
freer to narrow their gaze and focus on the core. Because economic and social 
rights were completely ignored in favour of civil and political rights, the pursuit of 
essential components of workers’ rights has been marginalised (Alston 2004: 483-
486; Sheldon & Quinlan 2011: 24). These include entitlements to a safe and healthy 
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workplace, limits on work hours, mandatory rest periods, protection against 
abusive treatment, and the right to a minimum or living wage (Alston 2004: 483-
486; Pearson & Seyfang 2002: 44-45).  
In this sense, feminist scholars have challenged the CLS framework’s ‘gender-
neutral’ language for sidelining the specific problems and concerns of women 
workers in the globalised, low-wage industries within which they are over-
represented such as garments (Beneria 2003: 94-98; Elias 2007: 51-52). Elias 
(2007: 52) suggests that the relegation of these rights as  
‘somehow peripheral to the universal human rights agenda lends credibility 
to the argument that the kinds of rights that will bring about meaningful 
change for the world’s poorest are somehow incompatible with [an] 
economic development model characterised by the increasing vulnerability 
of employment as labour markets are further deregulated and ‘flexibilised’.’ 
In the context of a global shift towards neoliberal economic strategies and private 
regulatory schemes, the Declaration’s focus on negative rights has undermined the 
ILO’s efforts to strengthen labourist industrial relations systems and removed the 
transformative character of international labour standards (Seidman 2009: 587; 
Standing 2008: 368; Uvin 2002: 3-4). In many contexts, the term ‘labour rights’ has 
now become synonymous with the minimalist approach contained in the 
Declaration (Alston 2004: 518). This has ramifications for the operation of 
democratic participation and accountability within states (Murray 2002: 41). The 
CLS was designed to be a more ‘flexible’ and adaptable labour standards device 
that complements rather than supersedes the ILO’s existing regime, but this has 
not played out in practice (Alston 2004: 461; Caraway 2006: 211-212; Murray 
2002: 40-41).  
Instead, Alston (2004: 459) argues that the Declaration ‘put forward a vision of 
labour standards which was much more palatable to many governments and 
employers in a world of ever increasing capital mobility,’ allowing them to make 
weak rhetorical commitments to an incredibly constraining and non-
transformative regime in which they are not held accountable. Banning ‘the worst 
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forms of child labour’, forced labour, campaigning against gender discrimination 
and defending union rights do not constitute a strategy or a progressive agenda 
(Standing 2008: 367). This raises questions regarding the viability of the ILO in the 
21st century as it seeks to legitimise the Declaration and pursues the vaguely 
defined ‘Decent Work’ agenda that it initiated in 1999, retreating into a ‘non-
confrontational mode that sidelines equality while espousing the vagueness of 
‘decency’, ‘fairness’ and ‘dialogue’’ (Standing 2008: 371). 
The phase-out of the MFA: ‘liberalising’ the garment industry and 
consolidating the commodity chain 
While debates on how to ‘protect’ workers in the garment industry were 
intensifying, the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations saw all garment importing 
countries commit themselves to progressively removing all MFA quotas between 
1995 and 2004 (Ernst et al. 2005: 1; Hale & Burns 2005: 211). The framework for 
the MFA’s phase-out was provided by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC)24 and overseen by the GATT’s newly-formed successor, the WTO (Ernst et al. 
2005: 1; Hale & Burns 2005: 211). Quota restrictions had created extra costs and 
reduced the flexibility made possible through the 'logistics revolution' in 
communications and transport technologies (Hale & Burns 2005: 215). In this 
context it had become more profitable for lead firms to remove barriers to global 
sourcing than to ‘protect’ local manufacturing (Gibbon 2008: 41; Hale & Shaw 
2001: 516). The phase-out of the MFA has already had significant effects on the 
global distribution of the industry and its trade patterns, with negative 
implications for garment workers everywhere (Hale & Burns 2005: 210). 
Whereas it previously made sense for large firms to locate factories in a large 
number of relatively uncompetitive countries, the MFA phase-out and ongoing 
liberalisation of the international garment trade have changed the logic of global 
sourcing and production and further incentivised the trend towards consolidation 
in supply chains (Appelbaum et al. 2005: 13; Bair 2008: 7). Competitiveness in the 
garment industry is increasingly driven by the extent to which production sites are 
                                                          
24 This thesis will continue to refer to the quota regime as the ‘MFA’, and the period following the 
removal of quotas as the ‘post-MFA’ period, in line with the academic literature. 
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vertically integrated, meaning their access to inputs produced in the ‘backward’ 
links of the commodity chain – fibres, yarns and fabrics – as well as ‘forward’ 
linkages to markets (Dussel-Peters 2008: 17). The increasing vertical integration 
of Asia and particularly China in most segments of the garment commodity chain is 
already negatively impacting other exporters that rely on simple assembly or ‘cut-
make-trim’ (CMT) work at the bottom of the chain, rather than higher value-added 
‘full package production’ (FPP)25 (Dussel-Peters 2008: 17; Quan 2008: 100).  
The countries whose garment industries expanded rapidly under the quota system 
had no natural resource base or historical tradition of garment exports26 (Hale & 
Burns 2005: 219). Their growth was spurred by the relocation of companies from 
other Asian countries which, having exhausted their own quotas, set up factories 
around the world in order to utilise those countries' unused quotas (Appelbaum et 
al. 2005: 3). Without preferential treatment, these countries are struggling to 
compete against stronger players with a common set of interlocking problems in 
production and distribution (Appelbaum et al. 2005: 8; Ernst et al. 2005: 1). They 
typically have poor infrastructure, rely on a single market (the US or European 
Union), specialise in a handful of product lines, and compete on low labour costs 
alone (Appelbaum et al. 2005: 8). This has resulted in garment industries generally 
characterised by low levels of efficiency, productivity, and quality (Appelbaum et 
al. 2005: 8; Quan 2008: 100). Their exports are also sensitive to fluctuations in 
demand that emerge from economic downturns such as the global financial crisis 
of 2008-2009 (Arnold & Toh 2010: 404).  
Discussions regarding who stands to gain and lose the most from the MFA phase-
out have often focussed on competition between countries, with less attention paid 
to the distribution of benefits between capital and labour (Hale & Burns 2005: 
224). However, the elimination of quotas has further intensified downwards 
pressure on unit prices and thus on wages and working conditions everywhere, for 
the labour-intensive nature of garment production means that wages are often one 
of the highest costs (Goto 2011: 946; Hale & Burns 2005: 221-224). Buyers are also 
                                                          
25 FPP production involves additional tasks such as design, prototypes, finishing, and distribution. 
26 Including countries targeted by Better Work, particularly Cambodia, Lesotho, Nicaragua and 
Haiti. 
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increasingly demanding in terms of lead times, flexibility, quality, and labour 
compliance, which translates into demands on workers to perform increased 
overtime and intensify the pace of work (Arnold & Toh 2010: 415; Barrientos & 
Smith 2007: 714).  
Conclusion: Illusions and reconfigurations 
These developments demonstrate that the international labour standards and 
trade regimes are continually reconfigured in order to prioritise the interests of 
capital over workers. The labour standards debate is often rhetorically focussed on 
protecting the rights of workers in low waged industries with poor working 
conditions, the kinds of jobs found at the ‘bottom end of global supply chains 
located in the developing world’ (Elias 2005: 53). However, the central driving 
force for most firms is the maintenance of profit levels in the face of intense 
competition (Hale & Shaw 2001: 516). Within labour-intensive industries such as 
garments this translates into downwards pressure on labour costs and increasing 
demands for flexibility (Hale 2000: 350; Hale & Shaw 2001: 519-521). Firms at the 
top of GCCs are therefore creating the conditions that operate against attempts to 
implement labour standards initiatives at the bottom (Caraway 2010: 238-239; 
Hale 2000: 353). The ILO’s Better Factories Cambodia program, the predecessor to 
the Better Work program examined in the following chapter, is therefore 
predicated on unrealistic assumptions about the capacity of supplier firms in 
developing countries to remain competitive while improving their labour 
standards compliance (Caraway 2010: 239). 
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Chapter Three 
Reputation versus Reality: Unveiling 
Better Factories Cambodia 
The previous chapter argued that the structural and institutional reconfigurations 
wrought over the last several decades in the global political economy prioritised 
capital accumulation at the expense of workers at the bottom of the garment 
commodity chain. This chapter elaborates on how this prioritisation has 
manifested in the Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) program, which emerged out of 
a bilateral trade agreement with the US and was the first instance of factory 
monitoring by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The chapter explores 
the complex reality behind the popular narrative that Cambodia is a ‘post-MFA 
success story’ which is navigating the ‘high road to better working conditions’ 
(Arnold & Toh 2010: 416; Wells 2006: 376).  
This empirical examination unfolds over four sections. The first section traces 
Cambodia’s conditioned entry into the global economy and the garment 
commodity chain in the mid-1990s. It argues that BFC’s emergence and early 
‘successes’ were contingent upon unique political-economic conditions in the US 
and Cambodia, and trade incentives that were only allowable under the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) quota system. The second section examines the significance of 
Cambodia’s garment industry to the wider economy and highlights the gendered 
nature of its workforce. The third section explains BFC’s current operating 
procedures, and explores the program’s post-MFA role within the Cambodian 
garment industry. It situates BFC within the structural and institutional constraints 
upon the industry’s prospects for economic and social ‘upgrading’. The fourth 
section analyses ongoing threats to labour standards and workers’ rights in the 
Cambodian garment industry, which have persisted despite BFC’s presence for 
over a decade. The chapter concludes that Cambodia’s experiences raise serious 
doubts regarding the long-term viability of the Better Work model of labour 
governance, a theme explored further in the next chapter. 
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Cambodia’s conditioned entry into the global economy and 
garment commodity chain 
Cambodia’s recent history of social struggles, war and political disintegration is a 
key factor in understanding why it entered the global economy from a severely 
disadvantaged bargaining position, with a single-party state and few domestic 
sources of resistance to policies pushing for a selective insertion into the global 
economy (Arnold & Toh 2010: 405; Dasgupta & Williams 2010: 151). Decades of 
conflict and upheaval during the US-Vietnam War, Khmer Rouge regime and 
Vietnamese occupation had devastating effects on Cambodia’s population, physical 
infrastructure and social fabric (Arnold & Toh 2010: 404-405; Brickell 2010: 458). 
Following a United Nations (UN) intervention and UN-sponsored elections in 1993, 
the post-conflict Cambodian state and society have been faced with the immense 
task of rebuilding from a relatively ‘blank canvas,’ which made the country 
conducive to development policy ‘experiments’ by foreign governments, 
international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGO) (Arnold & 
Toh 2010: 404-407; Derks 2008: 60). The economic foundation of the significant 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and development activity since the early 1990s has 
laid in conditional development aid, technical assistance, foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) in the garment industry (Arnold 
& Toh 2010: 407; Brickell 2010: 458). 
The US state, ILO, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in particular 
have sought to promote Cambodia as a new model of trade-led development, while 
disciplining the government on the workings of the global economy (Arnold & Toh 
2010: 401). The World Bank and IMF actively and aggressively encouraged the 
Cambodian government to adopt comprehensive market-oriented reforms through 
a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the mid-1990s (Derks 2008: 60; 
Soederberg 2007: 501). Cambodia’s SAP comprised multiple ‘good governance’ 
initiatives including the privatisation of state-owned corporations and services, the 
liberalisation of trade and investment, and low levels of taxation (Derks 2008: 60; 
Hall 2010: 431; Soederberg 2007: 501). A major goal of the SAP was to transform 
Cambodia’s garment industry from a small number of state-owned textile and 
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garment plants with negligible exports into a large, foreign-owned, export-
oriented industry (Staritz 2010: 105; Wells 2006: 365).  
Cambodia was a relative latecomer to the garment global commodity chain (GCC), 
only joining amidst the significant structural changes discussed in the previous 
chapter, including the phase-out of the MFA system, (Natsuda et al. 2010: 469-470; 
Staritz 2010: 104). The initial growth of the sector was driven by FDI from 
manufacturers in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore that had 
already reached their quota limits and were attracted by Cambodia’s low wages 
and relatively unprotected workforce (Dasgupta & Williams 2010: 152; Miller 
2009: 14; Natsuda et al. 2010: 470; Staritz 2010: 104; Wells 2006: 362). At that 
time, Cambodia was not a member of the WTO and thus not subject to quota 
restrictions under the MFA (Staritz 2010: 104; Wells 2006: 362). Cambodian 
labour laws and international labour standards were frequently violated, including 
excessive and forced overtime, wage infractions, debt bondage, poor occupational 
health and safety conditions, and repression of union organising and worker 
dissent (Hall 2010: 437-438; Wells 2006: 362-363). 
In response to international publicity of these labour violations, anti-sweatshop 
activism, and domestic political pressure over the outsourcing of US manufacturing 
jobs, the US and Cambodian governments implemented the US-Cambodia Textile 
and Apparel Trade Agreement (UCTA) in 1999 (Wells 2006: 362-363). This 
brought Cambodia under the MFA quota system only six years prior to its 
expiration (Hall 2010: 428; Staritz 2010: 105). The UCTA was the first bilateral US 
trade agreement to include a labour standards provision, and the only agreement 
to use trade-driven incentives (more quotas) to encourage increased government 
and employer compliance with labour standards, rather than the more traditional 
mechanism of sanctions (such as fines, reduced quotas or withdrawal of export 
licences) to punish non-compliance (Arnold & Toh 2010: 407; Merk 2012: 7; Miller 
2009: 16; Wells 2006: 360). The rationale behind this incentives approach was to 
demonstrate that ‘trade and export-oriented policies could reduce poverty and 
play a central role in the development process,’ making Cambodia a ‘showcase’ for 
other developing countries entering the global economy (Arnold & Toh 2010: 407). 
In this way, the US state was able to reward Cambodia’s adoption of market-
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friendly policies with preferential access to its lucrative market, while assuring the 
Cambodian state and manufacturers that they would face no additional penalties in 
the event of non-compliance (Hall 2010: 439; Scheuerman 2001: 371-372; Staritz 
2010: 105).  
In 2001 the ILO stepped in to monitor labour standards and provide compliance 
information under the ILO Garment Sector Working Conditions Improvement 
Project, which was the first instance of ILO factory monitoring and was later 
renamed Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) (Hall 2010: 429; Wells 2006: 361-364). 
The UCTA expired in 2004, due to the phase-out of the MFA quota system and 
Cambodia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Hall 2010: 441). 
Reputation-sensitive ‘buyers’ stepped in to fulfil the enforcement role of the US 
(Wetterberg 2011: 72). However, BFC’s emergence and early successes in 
encouraging a proliferation of trade unions and compliance improvements in 
certain areas were contingent upon unique political-economic conditions in the US 
and Cambodia, and trade incentives that were only allowable under the MFA quota 
system (Hall 2010: 429; Wells 2006: 375-376). As those conditions have changed 
BFC’s continued existence and impact have become increasingly uncertain with the 
expiration of the MFA and the UCTA in 2004, the global recession of 2008-2009, 
and the Cambodian state’s consolidation of its power in 2008 (Arnold & Toh 2010: 
419; International Human Rights Clinic and Resolution Centre & Workers’ Rights 
Consortium [hereafter IHRCRC & WRC] 2013: 2). 
Gendered poverty and informality 
Cambodia is a relatively small country of around 14 million people, with a single-
party-controlled government, a well-organised employer association (the Garment 
Manufacturers’ Association of Cambodia, or GMAC)27, few truly independent 
labour organisations, and a geographically concentrated garment industry28 
(IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 6). The garment industry already accounts for a significant 
                                                          
27 GMAC was founded in 1996 to advance the collective agenda of garment manufacturers operating 
in Cambodia. It aggressively lobbies the Cambodian government to take pro-manufacturer 
positions on issues including taxation, trade policy and the interpretation of the national labour law 
(Lowenstein Clinic 2011: 12). 
28 Most garment factories are clustered in and around the capital city Phnom Penh. 
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share of the country’s total exports, averaging around 85 percent or 95 percent 
when footwear is included (Natdusa et al. 2010: 470). The industry’s economic 
significance extends beyond the factories, and wage remittances to workers’ 
families are estimated to support around 1 million people (Dicaprio 2013: 114; 
Miller 2009: 13; Nam 2005: 1). The proliferation of factories has also stimulated a 
range of other, informal economic activities including housing provision, food 
stalls, karaoke bars, beauty parlours and other vendors (Derks 2008: 62; Heinonen 
2008: 126; Natsuda et al. 2010: 473).  
The connection between the garment industry and the livelihoods of Cambodians 
outside of direct factory employment is often highlighted to demonstrate the role 
of FDI in poverty eradication (Dicaprio 2013: 114; Soederberg 2007: 501). 
However, the garment industry’s impact on human development outcomes is 
complex and may not be as far reaching or sustainable in the long-run as is 
sometimes assumed (Heintz 2007: 1). The informal economy continues to provide 
employment, income and services for the majority of Cambodia’s citizens, perhaps 
as high as 85-90 percent, and women are disproportionately concentrated in 
informal enterprises (Heinonen 2008: 130; Mehrotra 2009: 111-116). Over 90 
percent of those living beneath the poverty line in Cambodia live in rural areas, 
and land dispossession and illegal evictions are common (Dicaprio 2013: 114). 
Cambodia’s recent economic growth, averaging 8 per cent per year during the 
period 1994-2009, has not been stable or equitably distributed and the country’s 
development has therefore been marked by increasing inequality, particularly 
between rural and urban areas and between men and women (Dasgupta & 
Williams 2010: 151-152; Heinonen 2008: 125). 
This wider political-economic context highlights the complexities surrounding 
Cambodian women’s integration into the garment commodity chain (Snyder 2008: 
191-193). It is estimated that 85-90 percent of Cambodia’s garment workers are 
young women, often rural-urban migrants, and many have no higher than a 
primary school education (Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic 
[hereafter Lowenstein Clinic] 2011: 8; Dasgupta & Williams 2010: 149; Miller 
2009: 12; Natsuda et al. 2010: 473). Cambodia’s garment workers are typically cast 
as ‘instrumental forces for economic development, often to the detriment of their 
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educational opportunities, and with little regard for familial workloads’ (Brickwell 
2010: 459). The narrative of dutiful, ‘nimble-fingered’ daughters neglects these 
women’s agency and capacity to negotiate the competing expectations and 
demands of their families, communities and employers (Derks 2008: 170-197; 
Snyder 2008: 182-183). The ‘dutiful daughters’ narrative also downplays the 
significance of the challenges facing these workers, who were previously 
embedded in rural life, as they encounter and adapt to new forms of labour 
organisation and contestation when entering the garment factory environment 
(Derks 2008: 71). In particular, these workers have to overcome numerous 
barriers to organising including cultural constraints, gender norms, historical 
inexperience and male-dominated union leadership (Esbenshade 2008: 458-459). 
Their transition into garment factories and worker organisations is fundamentally 
shaped by the presence of BFC. 
The reputational niche: Better Factories Cambodia’s role in the 
Cambodian garment industry 
The Better Factories Cambodia model: monitoring, reporting and 
remediation 
BFC relies on three core processes to protect and advance the interests of 
Cambodian garment workers, comprising of (1) monitoring, (2) reporting, and (3) 
remediation, sometimes termed ‘continuous improvement,’ which includes the 
provision of training and advisory services (Hall 2010: 443; Miller 2009: 14-15). 
Although BFC is an ILO entity, around 40 percent of its funding comes from 
international donor organisations (including the US government) (BFC 2013b; 
Lowenstein Clinic 2011: 11). The other 60 percent of funding comes from the 
Cambodian government, GMAC, Cambodian trade unions and buyers (BFC 2013b). 
From the outset, BFC has been supervised by a tripartite governance structure 
known as the Project Advisory Committee (PAC) which is comprised of equal 
representation from the Cambodian government, GMAC, and a rotating subset of 
union leaders (Finnegan 2013: 52; IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 29-30). The PAC meets 
periodically to assess BFC’s performance and review the contents of synthesis 
reports (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 29-30). The scope of BFC’s monitoring is restricted 
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to factories that hold an export licence and are registered with GMAC and the 
Cambodian Ministry of Commerce (Merk 2012: 19). This means that 
subcontractors (including informal enterprises and homeworkers) and factories 
producing for the domestic market are not subject to monitoring (Berik & Rodgers 
2010: 60). 
Factory monitoring and reporting remain the focus of the program (Lowenstein 
Clinic 2011: 11; Merk 2012: 7). Due to the growing number of factories and the 
program’s limited resources, visits generally occur only once per year rather than 
biannually as was originally hoped (Merk 2012: 19). BFC normally sends two ILO-
trained local monitors to each factory to conduct these visits, who use a large 
checklist of over 500 items based on Cambodian labour law and the ILO core 
labour standards (CLS) (Hall 2010: 444; Merk 2012: 7; Miller 2009: 14-15). These 
items cover freedom of association and collective bargaining, forced labour, child 
labour, discrimination, compensation, occupational health and safety, working 
hours, and contracts (BFC 2013c; Hall 2010: 444-445). The monitoring process 
includes interviews with management, workers, shop stewards and union leaders; 
observation of factory conditions or a factory walk-through; analysis of documents 
such as payroll records and time sheets; and observation of events such as trade 
union elections and collective bargaining sessions (Hall 2010: 444; Merk 2012: 7).  
BFC has two primary reporting mechanisms. First, BFC’s biannual ‘public synthesis 
reports’ aggregate data across all of BFC’s monitored factories (BFC 2013c; 
IHRCRC & WRC 2013: vi). These originally functioned as a surveillance mechanism 
for the US government to monitor Cambodia’s progress and establish quotas under 
the UCTA, but currently serve as more of a ‘calling card for Cambodia’ that 
publicises information regarding the evolution of working conditions (Merk 2012: 
8). According to BFC’s most recent synthesis report, by the first quarter of 2013 
the program covered 354 factories and 374 597 workers (BFC 2013a: 10).  Second, 
BFC’s ‘confidential factory reports’ offer individual factory managers and their 
buyers factory-specific results, and cannot be accessed by workers, their unions, or 
the public (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: vi; Merk 2012: 8). 
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BFC’s remediation procedures are significantly less formalised than its monitoring 
and reporting procedures. BFC’s expectation is that buyers will use factory reports 
to determine whether supplier factories are compliant, and if not, ‘encourage them 
to improve conditions’ and/or terminate their commercial relationship with the 
factory if improvements are not forthcoming (Merk 2012: 8). However, while the 
sale of confidential factory reports is a significant source of revenue for the 
program, buyers are also under no formal obligation to either purchase up-to-date 
reports or take any action based on their contents (BFC 2013d; Finnegan 2013: 52; 
Merk 2012: 15). The actual enforcement of labour laws remains the task of the 
Cambodian Ministry of Labour, despite the fact that its low capacity for 
enforcement and persistent issues with corruption were major impetuses for BFC’s 
implementation (Hall 2010: 430; Merk 2012: 15; Oka 2010: 62).  
Individual factories are held responsible for remediating violations but are 
constrained in their capacity to do so, given the structural and institutional 
constraints facing the garment industry (Merk 2012: 15). BFC offers a variety of 
training and advisory services to factory owners in order to guide them through 
their remediation efforts addressing non-compliance issues identified during 
monitoring (Merk 2012: 8). This remains a discretionary resource, and even 
chronically non-compliant factories are under no obligation to take advantage of 
the services; according to BFC’s Chief Technical Advisor only 20 factories chose to 
utilise them in 2012, up from a mere 12 in 2011 (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 41-42). 
Factory managers’ willingness and ability to address non-compliance issues is 
further constrained by the Cambodian industry’s uncompetitive position within 
the garment commodity chain. 
Cambodia’s limited prospects for economic and social ‘upgrading’: the post-
MFA role of BFC 
Despite fears that the MFA phase-out would result in a mass exodus of buyers from 
Cambodia, in the eighteen months following the expiration of the MFA and UCTA 
Cambodia’s garment industry actually grew by 10 percent (Natsuda et al. 2010: 
470; Shea et al. 2010: 104). While some brands explicitly attributed part of their 
decision to continue sourcing from Cambodia to the presence of BFC, there is no 
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evidence that this rhetorical enthusiasm has translated into a willingness to pay 
the higher prices required for wage increases and necessary investments to 
improve working conditions on the factory floor (Green 2009; IHRCRC & WRC 
2013: 35-36; Shea et al. 2010: 104). Furthermore, Cambodia exports only a small 
fraction of the total global supply of low-cost garments, which significantly 
hampers the ability of the Cambodian government, manufacturers and unions to 
make demands on foreign investors and buyers that can easily switch to other 
supplier markets (Green 2009; IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 4-5). The bulk of the 
country’s earnings are therefore ‘subject to the demands of international 
[garment] companies and these companies’ own shifting fortunes in the global 
marketplace’ (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 5).  
Cambodia’s precarious dependence on these ‘footloose’ investors and buyers was 
revealed after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 (Natsuda et al. 2010: 489). In 
the first quarter of 2009 garment exports dropped 26 percent, 50 factories closed, 
and over 60 000 workers were laid off (Arnold & Toh 2010: 404; Lowenstein Clinic 
2011: 7-8). Women were disproportionately affected by the crisis due to their 
predominance in the industry, and many found it difficult to secure alternative 
employment given their lack of transferable skills (Dasgupta & Williams 2010: 
158-159). Although the industry began to recover in 2010-2011, the country’s 
sensitivity to market fluctuations indicate the difficult and uncertain road ahead 
for Cambodia, given its dependence on the volatile and intensely competitive 
garment industry (Arnold & Toh 2010: 404; Merk 2012: 9).  
As indicated in the previous chapter, there has also been a shift in the sourcing 
strategies of major buyers since the MFA phase-out in 2004 towards strategic 
partnerships with major producers in key exporting countries (price, delivery, 
quality, and labour compliance must be met in the shortest time possible at the 
highest possible margin) (Arnold & Toh 2010: 415; Barrientos & Smith 2007: 714). 
This does not bode well for Cambodia, where producers generally lag in price, 
delivery time and quality, and labour compliance issues are becoming more 
pronounced due to the increasing prevalence of strikes and industrial disputes 
(Arnold & Toh 2010: 415).  
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The industry’s lack of competitiveness is due to a number of interrelated structural 
disadvantages. First, Cambodia’s garment industry remains reliant on FDI and 
factory ownership is highly concentrated and primarily foreign, with Cambodian 
investors accounting for only 7 percent of ownership in 2008 (Arnold 2013: 4; 
Berik & Rodgers 2010: 72; Staritz 2010: 117). Ownership structures are important 
as they determine how supplier firms are linked to global production and 
distribution networks, and the viability of Cambodia’s garment industry hinges not 
only on the performance of Cambodia’s factories but also on whether they serve 
the strategies of foreign owners (Natsuda et al. 2010: 471-474; Staritz 2010: 118). 
Second, Cambodia’s exports are heavily concentrated in a few basic product 
categories, partly as a result of the way the UCTA quotas were allocated, and the 
majority of exports are destined for the US market and to a lesser extent the 
European Union (EU) and Canada (Arnold & Toh 2010: 410-415; Natsuda et al. 
2010: 483; Staritz 2010: 114-116). 
Third, Cambodia’s garment industry is concentrated in cut-make-trim (CMT) 
production whereby factories are supplied with imported inputs and only engage 
in a few low value-added production steps (Dasgupta & Williams 2010: 153; 
Natsuda et al. 2010: 480-483; Staritz 2010: 119). Around 60 percent of factories 
are only involved in CMT production, typically as subsidiaries of foreign firms 
(Staritz 2010: 119). Fourth, Cambodia lacks local textile production capabilities 
and over 90 percent of its garment manufacturing inputs are imported while 
domestic inputs are limited to basic cardboard and plastic packaging materials 
(Dasgupta & Williams 2010: 153; Miller 2009: 13; Staritz 2010: 120).  
Fifth, while Cambodia’s physical and bureaucratic infrastructure have improved 
significantly since 1993 there are still major constraints particularly in the areas of 
power (particularly electricity and water) and logistics (particularly transport 
links and customs fees) (Arnold & Toh 2010: 410-415; Dasgupta & Williams 2010: 
153-154; Staritz 2010: 127-128). ‘Administrative’ costs due to corruption are 
another drag on price competitiveness and lead times (Arnold & Toh 2010: 414). 
Finally, the competitive benefits afforded by Cambodia’s low wages are partly 
offset by the industry’s low productivity and the lack of skills at worker, supervisor 
and management level (Arnold & Toh 2010: 410-415; Staritz 2010: 123-124). 
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Basic education and industry-specific training facilities for workers are incredibly 
limited given Cambodia’s history, and the skills gap is particularly pronounced in 
the areas of technical, design and management skills (Oxfam Australia 2013; 
Staritz 2010: 124).  
Together, these factors significantly diminish the Cambodian garment industry’s 
prospects for economic upgrading from the global commodity chain (GCC) 
perspective outlined in Chapter One, which has negative implications for ‘social 
upgrading’ through BFC (Natsuda et al. 2010: 486-487). For example, the 
industry’s foreign ownership structure means that a significant proportion of the 
profits generated are repatriated abroad rather than retained and reinvested in 
Cambodia (Dasgupta & Williams 2010: 153). By comparison, the majority of firms 
in Bangladesh and to a lesser extent in Vietnam are locally owned, which increases 
economic upgrading possibilities and the potential for local linkages and spillovers 
into the rest of the economy as more decision-making power is located locally 
(Natsuda et al. 2010: 474; Staritz 2010: 162). In this context, BFC acknowledge that 
while their ‘monitoring, advisory, and training work is focused primarily at the 
individual factory level… many of the issues [facing the garment industry]… are 
systemic in nature and require intervention relating to national policies or to 
relationships and pressures in the global supply chain’ (BFC 2013a: 8).  
The reality behind the popular narrative: persistent threats to 
labour standards and workers’ rights in Cambodia 
Following the removal of the UCTA’s quota incentives, Cambodian factory 
managers began to rely less on labour compliance as a source of competitive 
advantage and exerted downward pressure on working conditions in order to 
lower production costs (Arnold & Toh 2010: 9; Green 2009). This has resulted in 
significant backslides in the post-MFA post-UCTA period, as management 
strategies have included shifting the workforce to temporary employment 
contracts, expanding subcontracting to unmonitored factories, continuing to 
require excessive overtime, and aggressively resisting attempts by trade unions to 
collectively bargain for better wages and working conditions (Arnold 2013: 11; 
Finnegan 2013: 52-53; IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 36). Garment workers’ rights, roles 
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in production and livelihoods are considered tangentially important to the 
industry’s drive towards greater global competitiveness and economic growth 
(Nam 2005: 2).  
While global buyers are ‘demanding that Cambodia’s industry make good on its 
commitment to decent work,’ the data reveals waning attention to working 
conditions over the last several years (BFC 2013a: 1). In BFC’s words, while 
‘individual factories must take responsibility for positive changes, sector-wide 
change is unlikely without the sustained and targeted intervention of industry 
players such as GMAC, unions, and the Royal Government of Cambodia’ (BFC 
2013a: 1). The BFC program’s top-down and capital-centric implementation and 
operation are the most significant constraints upon the program’s capacity to 
deliver sustainable and progressive improvements for workers. Cambodian 
garment workers continue to work in difficult circumstances and their rights 
remain under threat, belying the popular narrative of BFC’s successes and 
Cambodia’s reputation as an ‘ethical’ or ‘sweat-free’ sourcing option (Arnold & Toh 
2010: 416; Wells 2006: 376). 
Threats to labour standards: wages and working conditions 
Cambodia’s garment workers continue to receive very low wages while performing 
long hours of work in conditions that threaten their health and safety. Despite the 
presence of BFC since 2001, by 2011 Cambodia had the second-lowest prevailing 
monthly wages for straight-time work – pay before tax deductions and excluding 
overtime – of any major garment exporter to the US, with workers earning 
approximately US$70 per month (WRC 2013a: 8).29 This represents a decline of 
19.2 percent in real terms since 2001, which is in line with global industry trends 
(WRC 2013a: 3).30 Garment workers do not live in absolute poverty, and their 
wages are above average in the context of Cambodia’s poor and largely informal 
economy (Dasgupta & Williams 2010: 152-153; Miller 2009: 12-13). However, 
                                                          
29
 The lowest was Bangladesh, at just US$50/month in 2011 (WRC 2013a: 8). 
30
 The WRC studied wage trends for 2001-2011 in 15 of the top 21 countries in terms of garment exports to 
the US, and found that most countries have seen declining real wages or growth that is so slow a living wage is 
decades away, resulting in an average wage that is only a third of the living wage (WRC 2013a: 2-4). The sole 
exception is China, whose workers experienced 124 percent wage growth during 2001-2011 thanks to 
changes in the minimum wage and strong export growth; workers are on track to achieve a living wage in 
2023 if current growth rates continue (WRC 2013a: 3). 
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their incomes generally do not provide them and their families with adequate 
nutrition, decent housing, and the other minimum necessities of a humane and 
dignified existence and in that sense remain below subsistence level (Pruett 2005: 
40; WRC 2013a: 2). Workers often reduce their own basic consumption and/or 
borrow money when their earnings decline in order to send remittances to their 
dependents or meet emergency expenses such as medical treatment (Chandararot 
& Dannet 2009: 7 & 19; Snyder 2008: 191-193). Despite these efforts, the average 
level of remittances is around a third of what is required to ensure a minimum 
living standard for workers’ families (Chandararot & Dannet 2009: 20-21).  
The ILO and leading NGOs maintain that a living wage should be attainable in a 
regular workweek without requiring overtime (WRC 2013a: 14). Despite the 
Ministry of Labour’s requirement that all overtime be voluntary and not exceed 
two hours per day, workers consistently perform illegally excessive amounts of 
overtime at around nine out of ten Cambodian factories (BFC 2012: 9; BFC 2013e: 
1). Multiple factors account for this pervasive and persistent violation of the 
country’s labour laws (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 10). Factory owners rely on overtime 
to accommodate the constantly fluctuating and often last-minute demands of 
buyers, while allowing them to maintain a smaller workforce and thus reduce their 
per-worker overhead costs (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 10-11; Pruett 2005: 39-40). 
Overtime is also a crucial component of many Cambodian garment workers’ 
earnings, constituting around 15 percent of their income by 2009 and providing a 
significant source of savings for cautionary and future purposes (Chandararot & 
Dannet 2009: 6-7). Workers’ attitudes about performing overtime are mixed. 
While they rely on overtime to supplement their inadequate wages, they often feel 
exhausted and want the freedom to opt out instead of being pressured by their 
employer to work longer hours (Derks 2008: 73-74; Pruett 2005: 39). 
Despite the fact that occupational health and safety issues are among those most 
amenable to corrections based on visual inspections of factory premises, compared 
to issues such as excessive overtime and freedom of association, non-compliance 
with basic labour standards remains endemic after more than a decade of BFC 
monitoring (Barrientos & Smith 2007: 716; IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 22). 
Approximately half the BFC-monitored factories stubbornly refuse the minimal 
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investments required to meet the basic occupational health and safety standards 
mandated by Cambodian labour law, such as adequate ventilation, access to 
drinking water, clear access paths and regular fire drills (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 
25). These low wages, excessive overtime, inadequate nutrition, exhaustion and 
unsafe working conditions have contributed to a series of mass faintings of 
workers in recent years. The widely publicised incidents have ranged from dozens 
to several hundred workers at a time, with at least 2 400 workers fainting in 2011 
alone (Merk 2012: 17). Whilst no workers have suffered serious injuries ‘it 
remains a worrying trend, which is detrimental to both the public image and 
efficiency of Cambodia’s factories’ (Merk 2012: 17). 
Threats to workers’ rights: freedom of association and collective bargaining 
The ability of Cambodia’s garment workers to achieve meaningful and sustained 
improvement in their wages and working conditions, the kind of changes 
necessary to deal with the mass fainting phenomenon, is constrained by threats to 
their rights to establish independent and democratic unions, bargain collectively 
and strike (Anner 2012: 632). Brands and retailers seeking to protect their 
competitive position and brand reputation also want to maintain control over their 
supply chains (Anner 2012: 633). Workers’ collective organising and bargaining 
efforts have the potential to disrupt supply chains and debilitate this control, 
which is why buyers like to participate in voluntary initiatives like BFC that place 
no real obligations on them (Anner 2012: 633; Natsuda et al. 2010: 487). They 
prefer to publicise their commitment to ‘no tolerance’ of labour standards 
violations like child labour and forced labour, while dampening workers’ freedom 
of association and collective bargaining rights even though they are also 
considered CLS (Anner 2012: 609; Caraway 2010: 238-239; Pearson 2007: 933). In 
this context, there are three significant threats undermining freedom of association 
and collective bargaining for Cambodian garment workers. 
First, while the proliferation of unions and the expansion of unionisation rates in 
the Cambodian garment industry have been touted as evidence of the program’s 
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success,31 only a small number of those unions operate without management or 
political influence, or pursue an agenda that advances the genuine interests of 
workers (Arnold 2013: 12-14). Cambodian labour law encourages union 
fragmentation and promotes collective bargaining at the enterprise rather than 
national level, in line with the ILO’s liberal interpretation of workers’ rights 
(Caraway 2006: 211). While the establishment of unions is a significant 
achievement, ‘it is of only limited value to workers if they cannot make use of 
collective representation to bargain for improvements in their working conditions’ 
(IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 20). In this sense, ‘promoting trade unions and state 
involvement in regulating labour relations does not necessarily entail empowered 
workers’ (Arnold & Toh 2010: 409). 
The large number of highly atomised federations and unions makes it difficult for 
genuine unions to promote the rights of their members, and many remain weak 
and under-funded due to competition and conflict (Arnold 2013: 13-14; Caraway 
2006: 226).  Hughes (2007: 846) suggests that BFC’s administrative and 
technocratic approach to monitoring and remediation also frames militant 
workers as ‘an irresponsible drag on the flourishing Cambodian economy.’ Given 
the absence of genuine negotiations with factory management, militant industrial 
actions such as wildcat strikes (organised by workers outside union structures) 
and mass demonstrations remain a common strategy for workers who feel their 
grievances are being ignored32 (Arnold 2013: 14-19; Arnold & Toh 2010: 419). 
Second, the state and GMAC have mobilised against union organisers and 
demonstrators with relative impunity thanks to numerous legal loopholes, while 
public space for criticising government policies is shrinking (Arnold & Toh 2010: 
409; Hall 2010: 430; Hughes 2007: 846). Union organisers are often subject to 
harassment, intimidation, dismissal, violence, arrests and even assassination, 
particularly when they attempt to coordinate industry-wide bargaining (Hughes 
2007: 844-847). This repressive environment is demonstrated by the recent 
                                                          
31
 Cambodia’s garment industry has the highest union density of any industry in Asia, and one of the highest 
unionisation rates (percentage of factories with at least one union present) of any major garment-producing 
countries in the world (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 17). 
32 For example in September 2010, at least 200 000 garment workers from over 100 factories 
participated in strike actions to lobby for higher wages (Arnold 2013: 17-19) 
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history of one of the industry’s few independent unions, the Free Trade Union of 
Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia (FTUWKC) (Arnold & Toh 2010: 416; 
Hughes 2007: 846-847). In January 2004 its national president, Chea Vichea, was 
shot dead in broad daylight on a Phnom Penh street (Clean Clothes Campaign 
2007). This was followed by the assassination of two of the FTUWKC’s top factory-
level leaders, Ros Sovannarith and Hy Vuthy, in May 2004 and February 2007 
respectively (Clean Clothes Campaign 2007). The credibility of the Cambodian 
justice system has been seriously compromised by the apparently dubious 
investigations of the three cases, fuelling allegations that the killings were 
sanctioned or even perpetrated by the state (Clean Clothes Campaign 2008; 
Hughes 2007: 847). While the cases attracted widespread condemnation from 
local and international organisations and prompted several mass demonstrations, 
they disturbingly passed without an official statement from BFC or mention in the 
program’s newsletter or synthesis reports33 (Hughes 2007: 846; IHRCRC & WRC 
2013: 20).  
Finally, factory managers increasingly use informal and flexible short-term and 
daily labour to maintain or increase profit and to avoid the demands of organised 
workers (Arnold & Toh 2010: 409; Lowenstein Clinic 2011: 14). Cambodian labour 
law has two main categories of employment contract – undetermined duration 
contracts (UDC) which are valid for unlimited time, and fixed duration contracts 
(FDC) valid for a specific period usually 3-6 months, after which they can be 
extended indefinitely if workers and employers ‘agree’ on the terms (Arnold & Toh 
2010: 417; Lowenstein Clinic 2011: 17-19). During BFC’s initial phase in 2001-
2005, the majority of workers in registered garment factories were UDC workers 
with associated benefits such as sick and maternity leave, regular wages, and 
holidays (Arnold & Toh 2010: 417; Lowenstein Clinic 2011: 14). Since 2005, nearly 
all GMAC factories have converted their workforces to FDCs, and following the 
2008 recession the terms have generally shortened from 6 to 3 months (Arnold & 
Toh 2010: 417; Lowenstein Clinic 2011: 15).  
                                                          
33 For example in the synthesis report issued a month after Vichea’s death, BFC concluded that 
‘there has been some improvement in ensuring freedom of association and protection against anti-
union discrimination, though this remains a problem in a small number of factories’ (BFC 2004: 6; 
Hughes 2007: 846). 
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FDCs have become the biggest challenge for trade union organising and workers’ 
livelihoods, for they allow employers to not renew the contracts of workers who 
engage in union activism, thereby intimidating other workers into foregoing their 
associational rights (Arnold 2013: 11; Lowenstein Clinic 2011: 77). The expansion 
of FDCs has also been a major factor in the increase of plant-level strikes since 
2005 (Arnold & Toh 2010: 418; Lowenstein Clinic 2011: 15). Taking a public 
position the excessive use of FDCs would seemingly fall within BFC’s mandated 
role to ‘help draft new laws and regulations for improving working conditions and 
to make labour laws more effective’ (Wells 2006: 364). However, BFC has 
primarily addressed labour rights abuses related to FDCs through private and 
informal channels, rather than its published newsletter and synthesis reports 
(IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 14). 
Conclusion: A problematic template for upgrading 
The structural and institutional constraints operating against the Cambodian 
garment industry’s competitiveness and prospects for both economic and social 
upgrading highlight the wider context within which BFC is embedded and the 
perverse effect of the program on Cambodia’s development prospects. In the early 
2000s, the UCTA and BFC artificially promoted and protected a garment industry 
in a country that was always destined to be in an uncompetitive position when the 
MFA quota regime was phased out in 2004 (Dasgupta & Williams 2010: 152). 
Instead of pursuing economic and export diversification, the Cambodian economy 
was made reliant on garment exports and thus vulnerable to changes in the global 
economy and particularly in the volatile and competitive garment industry (Arnold 
& Toh 2010: 404 & 410-415; Staritz 2010: 109-125). As indicated in the previous 
chapter, the MFA’s phase-out should not have been an unanticipated challenge 
given that it was negotiated in 1994. Nevertheless, the precarious nature of work 
in Cambodia’s garment factories now restrict possibilities for enduring forms of 
collective action and workers’ ability to engage in BFC’s tripartite governance 
structures (Arnold 2013: 19). Cambodia’s experience therefore raises serious 
doubts regarding the long-term viability of both EOI strategies and the Better 
Work model of labour governance, a theme explored further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Institutionalising the Contradictions 
of the Chain 
As argued in the previous chapter, the limited impacts of Better Factories 
Cambodia (BFC), particularly in the post-MFA period, raises serious doubts 
regarding the long-term viability of the Better Work model of labour governance. 
This chapter elaborates on the deeper contradictions of the Better Work model in 
three sections. The first section examines the expansion of the Better Work 
program into other garment manufacturing countries after 2008. It considers 
evidence from several Better Work countries and argues that the program’s lack of 
success is not isolated to Cambodia. The second section delves into why BFC and 
Better Work have had such limited impact. It argues that the BFC program’s well-
documented ‘procedural issues’ should not be interpreted as remediable design 
flaws. Rather, they are rooted in the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) 
problematic mediation of the contradictions between capital, the state and labour. 
The third section takes this critical analysis further and scrutinises the paradoxical 
logic and priorities underpinning Better Work. It argues that the program 
reproduces the social relations and conditions of production it is notionally 
designed to address. The chapter concludes that Better Work fails to disrupt 
deeply embedded structures of inequality in the gendered garment industry and 
global political economy, and ultimately reinforces the power of large buyers and 
powerful states to the detriment of garment workers. 
Replicating the experiment: the global spread of Better Work 
The early successes of BFC were largely dependent on the quota incentives offered 
under the US-Cambodia Textile and Apparel Trade Agreement (UCTA), and the 
program has since struggled to generate sustainable and progressive 
improvements for Cambodia’s garment workers (Oka 2010: 62). Nevertheless, the 
ILO was encouraged by these initial results as they lent credence to the hope that 
the experiment may be replicable in other garment manufacturing countries 
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(Wetterberg 2011: 71-72). In 2007 the ILO formed a partnership with the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), a division of the World Bank group, to 
launch the expanded Better Work program. The partners argue that this 
collaboration was designed to combine the ILO’s expertise in social dialogue and 
the application of labour standards, with the IFC’s credibility, investment networks 
and expertise in private-sector development (Better Work 2012b). The rollout of 
the program commenced amidst the Cambodian garment industry’s downturn 
during the global recession of 2008-2009.  
Better Work was established in Jordan in 2008, Vietnam and Haiti in 2009, Lesotho 
in 2010, and Indonesia and Nicaragua in 2011 (Better Work 2012c; Better Work 
2012d; Better Work 2012e; Better Work 2012f; Better Work 2012g; Better Work 
2012h). Plans are underway to extend Better Work to other major garment-
producing countries such as Bangladesh and Morocco, and to other labour-
intensive light manufacturing industries including footwear, toys and consumer 
electronics (Better Work 2012a). Participation remains voluntary for factories in 
Vietnam, Lesotho, Indonesia and Nicaragua (Better Work 2012e; Better Work 
2012f; Better Work 2012g; Better Work 2012h). The Jordanian program was made 
mandatory in 2011 but is yet to achieve industry-wide coverage, while the Haitian 
program is mandatory but only covers factories exporting to the US (Better Work 
2012c; Better Work 2012d). According to Better Work, the primary purpose of 
their country programs is to achieve sector-wide, sustainable improvements in 
adherence to national labour law and core labour standards (CLS) (social 
upgrading) while strengthening factories’ competitiveness in global supply chains 
(economic upgrading) (Better Work 2012a).  
Progress towards these dual upgrading goals has been difficult across the board. In 
Haiti, for example, where a new minimum-wage law was passed in 2012 to raise 
garment workers’ salaries to 300 gourdes for an eight-hour day (around US$6.90), 
the country’s most recent synthesis report revealed 100 percent of monitored 
factories had failed to comply, continuing to pay the previous wage of 200 gourdes 
(around US$4.60) (Doucet 2013). In Jordan, garment factories accorded ‘Golden 
List’ status by the Ministry of Labour, which are supposed to be the ‘very best’ 
export garment factories that meet or exceed all of the nation’s labour laws, have 
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been found to pay their workers well below minimum wage, have mandatory 
overtime and permit no rest or sick days (Institute for Global Labour and Human 
Rights 2012: 3). In Vietnam, local law does not respect freedom of association or 
the right to collective bargaining. ‘Wildcat strikes’ occur often, many times in 
protest of abusive treatment or other labour law violations by factory managers, 
and the workers who lead such strikes can suffer firing, blacklisting, physical 
violence and imprisonment as a result of employer and state retaliation (WRC 
2013b: 2). These difficulties indicate that the program’s lack of success is not 
isolated to Cambodia. To determine why the programs have had such limited 
impact, it is necessary to examine Better Work’s procedural template – BFC. 
‘Win-win-lose’: Better Factories Cambodia’s problematic relations 
with capital, the state and labour 
BFC’s ineffective ‘procedural issues’ have been well documented in the academic 
literature (Berik & Rodgers 2010; Dicaprio 2013; Miller 2009; Wells 2006) and by 
NGOs including Clean Clothes Campaign (Merk 2012) and Workers’ Rights 
Consortium (IHRCRC & WRC 2013). Although these authors generally 
acknowledge the significant structural impediments to improvements, in most 
cases these arguments form the background for their proposed fixes for the 
program’s ‘design flaws’. However, in conceptualising seemingly ‘technical 
questions’ of policy design, implementation and monitoring ‘within the 
manifestations of power and uneven development that are central to the workings 
of global capitalism,’ the problematic character of the program itself is neglected 
(Taylor 2011: 446). In this context, the BFC program’s ‘procedural issues’ should 
not be interpreted as remediable design flaws. Rather, they are rooted in the ILO’s 
attempt to mediate the contradictions between capital, the state and labour. The 
program thus reflects and reinforces unequal power relations within the garment 
industry, as it seeks to maintain the goodwill of buyers, factory managers and 
developing country states at the expense of garment workers. 
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Relationship with capital: factory managers and buyers 
The majority of BFC’s monitoring, reporting and remediation activities are entirely 
shielded from external scrutiny, preventing the public from verifying BFC’s claims 
about its ongoing positive impact on compliance and reducing the obligations 
placed on factory owners and buyers (O’Rourke 2006: 909-910; Miller 2009: 17). 
The promise of greater orders from buyers, and the corresponding risk of losing 
them as a result of reputational damage, has always been the primary source of 
BFC’s support from both the Cambodian government and the Garment 
Manufacturers’ Association of Cambodia (GMAC) (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 73; 
Lowenstein Clinic 2011: 12-13). BFC’s lack of transparency and obligations 
impedes the market-driven ‘enforcement’ process in at least four ways. First, it is 
difficult to gain insight into a factory’s record from a single confidential report and 
verify their remediation efforts, as BFC’s questionnaire does not require its 
monitors to document whether the issues raised in previous visits have been 
addressed (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 62). This longitudinal track record of a factory 
matters, as the appropriate remediation and enforcement measures differ 
depending upon whether the managers are taking meaningful steps to remedy 
labour rights issues (Finnegan 2013: 11-12; IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 62).  
Second, the only publicly available data generated by BFC is the sector-wide, 
aggregated data presented in its biannual synthesis reports, which contain no 
specific details about the methodology used to collect it and which cannot be easily 
tracked over time (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 40). This shields BFC from external 
scrutiny of its methodology, reducing the incentives for the organisation to 
strengthen its monitoring and reporting work (Finnegan 2013: 17-18; IHRCRC & 
WRC 2013: vi; O’Rourke 2006: 911). The synthesis reports generally only discuss a 
small subset of the findings made by BFC monitors during factory visits, and the 
framing and presentation of that data through non-quantitative language is the 
product of intense negotiations among the Project Advisory Committee (PAC) 
members (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 44). While BFC presents itself as an authoritative 
and non-partisan source of information on Cambodia’s factories, the synthesis 
reports are more reflective of politically expedient compromise than of rigorously 
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independent oversight and in this sense fail to capture the true state of the sector 
(Finnegan 2013: 27-29; Hughes 2007: 845; IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 44). 
Third, the scope of BFC’s monitoring is restricted to factories that hold an export 
licence and are registered with GMAC and the Cambodian Ministry of Commerce 
(Merk 2012: 19). This means that both subcontractors (including informal 
enterprises and homeworkers) and factories producing for the domestic market 
are not subject to monitoring (Berik & Rodgers 2010: 60). Since 2005, GMAC 
factories have increasingly relied on subcontractors due to the fluctuating nature 
of demand, the need to fulfil orders within very short time-frames, and the desire 
to evade monitoring (Lowenstein Clinic 2011: 14). Estimates of their precise 
number in Cambodia range anywhere between 300-3000, and some larger 
factories are known to have up to a dozen subcontracted facilities (Merk 2012: 19). 
While BFC has acknowledged the issue of subcontracting factories in particular 
and pursued small pilot programs in monitoring their operations, there has not 
been much movement on the issue (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 22). Working conditions 
and wages in these subcontracting factories and for homeworkers are generally 
much poorer than in regulated GMAC factories, and unions are effectively non-
existent (Finnegan 2013: 52-53; Merk 2012: 19).  
Finally, buyers retain complete discretion over whether to purchase confidential 
factory reports and whether to seek remediation of the violations that are 
identified (Miller 2009: 18). BFC prevents the public from judging buyers’ 
performance by concealing information regarding buyer-factory relationships and 
buyers’ contributions, or lack thereof, to the remediation process (Berik & Rodgers 
2010: 76; O’Rourke 2006: 911; Miller 2009: 17-18). This lack of transparency acts 
as a disincentive for motivated and progressive factory owners and buyers while 
protecting chronically non-compliant ones (Finnegan 2013: 53; IHRCRC & WRC 
2013: 43). Even ‘reputation-sensitive’ buyers are unlikely to take meaningful 
action based on this sensitivity if they doubt their failures to address labour rights 
violations in their supply chains will ever be exposed (O’Rourke 2006: 911; Miller 
2009: 17-18). 
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Relationship with the state: the Cambodian government and the relevant 
Ministries 
BFC’s ‘continued dependence on government and industry support severely 
constrains its ability to advocate publicly for workers’ rights,’ particularly given 
the weak position of workers’ representatives within the PAC (IHRCRC & WRC 
2013: 55). While some ILO bodies routinely pass judgment on countries’ 
adherence to international labour standards, BFC’s country director Jill Tucker 
considers advocacy to be over and above her core mandate, ‘possibly even in 
tension with the neutrality she feels is so important for BFC’s monitoring and 
reporting functions’ (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 54). In contrast Rong Chhun, President 
of the Cambodian Conference of Unions (CCU), has stated that BFC’s resistance to 
taking a more forceful public stance on key policy issues affecting Cambodian 
garment workers makes it easier for the government and GMAC to suppress public 
debate, diminishing BFC’s potential to promote positive change (IHRCRC & WRC 
2013: 54-55).  
BFC has also indicated that ‘the industry’s chronically non-compliant factories 
[should] be held accountable’ (BFC 2013e: 2), even though their non-transparent 
reporting mechanisms specifically shield those factories from public scrutiny 
(Merk 2012: 20; IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 38-46). Instead, BFC chooses to selectively 
share its data on chronically non-compliant factories with the relevant government 
ministries ‘in an effort to strengthen legal enforcement’ (BFC 2013a: 8). These 
ministries are widely recognised to be under-funded, with low capacity for 
enforcement and persistent issues of corruption (Oka 2010: 62; Merk 2012: 15-
16). Indeed, there have been no recorded instances of the Ministry of Commerce 
actually sanctioning a factory for non-compliance based on BFC’s monitoring 
(IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 45-46). 
Relationship with labour: workers and unions 
Interviewing workers is an important element of any factory monitoring process, 
as it is workers who are continually present at the production site and have first-
hand experience of working conditions (O’Rourke 2006: 910). The procedure must 
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be handled carefully, as managers might try to deceive monitors by coaching 
workers before they are interviewed to convey false or misleading information, 
and by threatening workers’ jobs if they actually describe the real working 
conditions they face (Finnegan 2013: 26; Merk 2012: 19). This deception is 
encouraged by a system where buyers demand both compliance with labour 
standards and the lowest possible prices for goods (O’Rourke 2006: 907-908; 
Pruett 2005: 16; Shannon 2010: 31). The context in which workers are 
interviewed greatly influences whether they will speak openly or simply tell 
monitors what their employers want them to say (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 40; Pruett 
2005: 16). Group interviews held on factory premises are highly susceptible to 
employer coaching and coercion, given that workers’ anonymity is not protected 
and workers who speak out may be named by their colleagues (Finnegan 2013: 26; 
Merk 2012: 19-20). It is difficult to ascertain how systematically BFC monitors 
pursue off-site interviews, and evidence suggests that they are conducted in a 
relatively informal and ad-hoc fashion (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 48-49).  
BFC has also failed to offer workers a political role in determining their own future, 
divorcing issues of pay and conditions on the factory floor from wider questions 
regarding power relations between workers, their employers, and the state 
(Hughes 2007: 846). While BFC monitors derive much of their information about 
workplace conditions from the workers with whom they speak, this information 
flows one way and workers have no way of accessing or commenting on what BFC 
does with the information it collects (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 43; Pruett 2005: 49). 
An adequate complaints mechanism would involve both a worker/employer 
grievance handling system at the level of the supplier factory, and a means by 
which workers or their representatives can take their complaint up to the level of 
BFC or even the buyer if it is not resolved by their employer (Finnegan 2013: 13-
16; Pruett 2005: 77). However, BFC offers no adequate procedure for workers to 
report violations in a way that will be followed up (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 43). This 
leaves individual workers in the disempowered role of respondent, dependent on 
the monitors’ directives regarding what information is considered most relevant 
for BFC but without any ability to influence or even know what actions BFC will 
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take in response (Finnegan 2013: 13-16; IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 59; Pruett 2005: 
49-50). 
The paradoxical logic of Better Work 
The BFC program’s (and thus Better Work’s) ‘procedural issues’ are rooted in the 
ILO’s problematic mediation of the contradictions between capital, the state and 
labour. Better Work is founded on paradoxical logic which is institutionalised in 
two ‘spaces’ – the tripartite governance institutions that mediate social relations, 
and the market-driven enforcement mechanisms that mediate conditions of 
production. First, four problems emerge from the top-down institutionalisation of 
tripartite labour governance in developing countries enmeshed in global 
commodity chains. Better Work is ineffective at dealing with the complexity of 
subcontracting relationships in the garment commodity chain, the regulatory 
challenges facing developing states, the weak bargaining position of workers, and 
the gendered organisation of global production and governance institutions. 
Second, there are two contradictions associated with the institution of market-
driven enforcement mechanisms in a buyer-driven commodity chain. These 
contradictions are the prioritisation of capital accumulation over labour standards 
and the subsequent lack of incentives for improvements enforcement. 
Tripartite governance and social relations 
Better Work should be understood within the context of the ILO’s broader agenda 
to adapt, promote and institutionalise its tripartite model of labour governance in 
the developing world (Alston 2004: 458-461). Effective tripartite negotiations are 
reliant upon the existence of clearly established formal employment relationships; 
strong national governments that are able (and willing) to enforce labour 
regulations; and strong unions that have the capacity to bargain collectively with 
employers (Standing 2008: 379). These conditions do not reflect the reality of the 
contemporary global economy, and there are four key constraints upon Better 
Work’s implementation and operation of effective and equitable tripartite labour 
governance institutions that further the interests of women workers in the 
garment commodity chain. 
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First, Better Work does not address the complexity of subcontracting relationships 
in the garment commodity chain. Subcontracting makes it difficult to clearly 
identify employers and employees and obfuscates the fact that buyers do not 
simply purchase an end product (Cheng & Gereffi 1994: 63-68; Hale 2000: 352; 
O’Rourke 2006: 907; Standing 2008: 365). This makes it difficult to pin down 
precisely where ultimate responsibility for labour standards and workers’ rights 
lies (Bair 2009: 20; Miller 2009: 17). While factories are technically the direct 
employers of the formal workforce, buyers coordinate and control many aspects of 
the production process and their sourcing practices often severely undermine 
labour standards and workers’ rights (Hale 2000: 351; Merk 2012: 23). Buyers 
expect factories to comply with increasingly detailed labour standards while 
simultaneously lowering costs and shortening lead times (Pruett 2005: 78-79; 
Taylor 2011: 447).  
These buyer-driven demands limit factory owners’ ability to turn a profit under 
intensely competitive conditions while enforcing the type of disciplinary labour 
conditions, including forced overtime and intensive labour processes, necessary to 
react to the demands of buyers for flexible production to meet fluctuating demands 
(Pruett 2005: 78; Taylor 2011: 452). The employers’ associations that participate 
in Better Work’s tripartite governance institutions, such as the Garment 
Manufacturers’ Association of Cambodia (GMAC), are therefore limited in their 
ability to make long-term commitments for improvements, even if they wanted to 
(Merk 2012: 23; Miller 2009: 16-18; Pruett 2005: 79). 
Second, Better Work does not sufficiently tackle the regulatory challenges facing 
developing states. The issue is not primarily one of insufficient protective labour 
standards, although workers’ rights to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining are typically areas of concern (Anner 2012: 613). Rather, developing 
states lack the funding, capacity, technical capability and administrative integrity 
to effectively administer and enforce their growing number of regulations and 
policies (Becker 2004: 23; Oka 2010: 62). Economic dependency on the garment 
industry for investment and revenue also acts as a powerful disincentive against 
applying strong penalties on non-compliant factories (Islam & McPhail 2011: 792; 
IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 45-46).  
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Better Work exists precisely because of these regulatory challenges, yet the 
program is reliant upon those states to enforce their labour laws in the instance of 
violations (BFC 2013e: 8; Hall 2010: 430; Oka 2010: 62; Miller 2009: 16). As 
Seidman (2007: 144) argues, there is no substitute for strong, democratic states 
that are both able and willing to enforce robust national labour laws in order to 
improve labour standards and workers’ rights. Better Work does not engage states 
on the need to strengthen their own weak regulatory capacity nor get involved in 
policy advocacy concerning issues of most concern to workers such as living wage 
demands (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 54; Seidman 2009: 594). 
Third, Better Work does not seek to resolve the weak bargaining position of 
workers. The ILO’s liberal interpretation of workers’ rights encourages union 
fragmentation and discourages centralised collective bargaining (Caraway 2006: 
211 & 226). Selwyn (2013: 86) further argues that the ILO problematically 
conceptualises the institutionalisation of capital-labour relations as analytically 
prior to those relations themselves, regarding workers’ actions as secondary to the 
institutional arrangements between capital, labour, and the state. In practice, 
Better Work does not regulate a rigid set of production relations and has been 
implemented with a ‘focus on remedying the most visible and simplest dimensions 
of work relations while attempting to stymie a broader transformation of the 
power structures in place’ (Barrientos & Smith 2007: 726-727).  
In this sense, Hughes (2007: 834) suggests that Better Work’s seemingly 
collaborative tripartite agenda is underpinned by a marked insistence on highly 
regulated and atomising modes of participation designed to demobilise and 
depoliticise contentious groups. Capital-labour confrontations are routed through 
internationally sanctioned sites of participation, undermining the genuine 
representation of workers’ collective interests (Hughes 2007: 834; Munck 2009: 
617). Within these sanctioned sites, whereas states and employers’ associations 
are centralised organisations, workers’ representatives (unions) are fragmented 
into a number of competing organisations, and many are heavily influenced by the 
state and employers (Arnold & Toh 2010: 445; Hall 2010: 429-430). This makes it 
difficult to achieve a genuine balance of interests. 
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Finally, Better Work does not address the gendered organisation of global 
production and governance institutions. The program is underpinned by the 
implicit assumption that gender inequalities are located externally to markets, 
which are conceptualised as formally gender-neutral institutions (Roberts & 
Soederberg 2012: 952-953; Elias 2007: 46; Elson 1999: 611). Women are over-
represented in lower-paid, informal and ‘flexibilised’ jobs, and comprise the 
majority of the global garment workforce (Beneria 2003: 77-78; Elson 1999: 617; 
Kaur 2004: 37-38). However, Better Work is not aimed at transforming the 
traditional notion of ‘labour’ as a male ‘breadwinner’. Instead, it is designed to 
make that type of labour more accessible to women, given that women working in 
urban garment factories often remit a significant portion of their income home to 
support their rural families (Dasgupta & Williams 2010: 149 & 163). 
Conversely, the specific concerns of women workers are not adequately 
represented in any of the three stakeholder groups within Better Work’s tripartite 
framework, given their under-representation in factory managerial roles, senior 
government positions, and union leadership positions (Caraway 2005: 423-424; 
Elias 2007: 51-52; Hale & Shaw 2001: 522-523; Pearson & Seyfang 2002: 51). For 
example, Better Work does not address ‘non-employment’ issues faced by women 
workers in the garment industry, including problems such as childcare, housing, 
and education (Ruwanpura 2011: 203). These issues exist outside the factory 
environment but have a significant impact upon labour relations inside the factory 
(Ruwanpura 2011: 203). Better Work has also had a limited impact on conditions 
inside the factory environment. 
Market-driven enforcement and conditions of production 
A major impetus for the existence of Better Work is the prevalence of deleterious 
conditions of production in the garment industry. However, the program interacts 
with existing forms of discipline and contestation rather than remaking the politics 
of production in the garment industry’s buyer-driven commodity chain (BDCC) 
(Taylor 2011: 447). Labour standards compliance has instead been transformed 
into an additional source of competitive advantage for factories seeking orders 
from reputation-sensitive buyers that wish to publicise their commitment to their 
68 
 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Pearson 2007: 734; Roberts & Soederberg 
2012: 956).  Rarely questioned is the underlying assumption that there is no 
necessary contradiction between the pursuit of social values such as fair labour 
standards and continuing competitive accumulation through profit maximisation 
and continuous growth (Pruett 2005: 78-79; Taylor 2011: 449). Better Work’s 
market-driven governance model ultimately prioritises capital accumulation over 
labour standards in two interrelated ways. 
First, Better Work’s primary focus is on monitoring production in individual 
factories, and the program neglects to engage seriously with declining real wages 
and threats to workers’ rights (Miller 2009: 23). The program also exclusively 
targets formal rather than informal spaces of production, despite the fact that 
subcontracting and short-term employment contracts are pervasive in the garment 
industry and facilitate the evasion of labour standards and workers’ rights (Berik & 
Rodgers 2010: 60; O’Rourke 2006: 907-908). This means that the program has no 
jurisdiction to protect the significant proportion of the workforce whose labour 
standards and rights are most under threat, and allows factories and their buyers 
to shield a significant aspect of their operations from public scrutiny (Berik & 
Rodgers 2010: 60; IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 22). As Elson (1999: 624) suggests, 
maintaining a strong dichotomy between a ‘formal sector’ within which attempts 
are made to set and enforce comprehensive labour standards, and an ‘informal 
sector’ which is left completely outside of the realm of governance, tends to 
undermine the purpose of having standards in the first place. 
While Better Work has elicited small improvements in certain factory procedures, 
it has sought to do so without undermining the prevailing disciplinary nature of 
labour relations by facilitating the genuine independent association and 
organisation of workers (Taylor 2011: 447). Provisions that empower workers to 
self-organise and bargain collectively are routinely undermined by factories and 
states because these actions threaten the political basis upon which the 
restructuring of the global economy over the past several decades has been 
predicated (Arnold & Toh 2010: 416; Pruett 2005: 29; Taylor 2011: 445). Factory 
managers often transfer compliance expenses that they do incur, primarily for 
superficial health and safety issues, onto workers under the pretext of maintaining 
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competitiveness, particularly through wage compression and the withdrawal of 
benefits (Pruett 2005: 14; Taylor 2011: 455). Meanwhile, workers’ productivity (or 
the ‘rate of exploitation’) has increased as they are required to meet higher targets 
at a faster pace in order to meet buyers’ demands while their real wages have 
stagnated or declined over the last decade (Miller 2009: 26; WRC 2013a: 2). 
Second, Better Work is constructed primarily as a voluntary promotional service 
for buyers and developing country states, rather than as an enabling framework 
for workers to hold these actors accountable (Miller 2009: 26). The program’s top-
down elaboration and implementation has ultimately accorded little space for 
workers or their interests to be adequately represented in the process (Pearson & 
Seyfang 2002: 51; Pearson 2007: 735; Pruett 2005: 14). Without workers’ full 
participation their concerns, particularly gender-related concerns, are often 
missed (Pruett 2005: 14). For voluntary initiatives to be credible there is also a 
need for transparency and accountability (Alston 2004: 512). As discussed in the 
previous section, Better Work’s promotional agenda means that it shields factory 
owners, their buyers and developing country states from public scrutiny in order 
to protect their reputations and thus their market position, undermining the 
legitimacy of the program in the process. Better Work’s lack of transparency allows 
these actors to claim that they are addressing problems without being held 
publicly accountable and ‘the result is an organisation charged with policing 
violations that approaches its work as if one of its primary tasks were to maintain 
the goodwill of those same violators’ (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 55).  
Better Work also lacks the mandate, the resources, and the systemic verification 
procedure to see that violations are remedied (Finnegan 2013:  IHRCRC & WRC 
2013: 41; Pruett 2005: 14). While the program regularly identifies labour rights 
violations in the factories it monitors, it does not share that information with those 
who would ensure effective action to address those problems (Esbenshade 2008: 
457; IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 76). In the absence of independent and transparent 
information regarding the conditions in the factories where their clothes are 
manufactured, buyers can describe their labour practices and policies however 
they wish (Finnegan 2013: 17-19). Better Work also declines to engage states and 
employers on the repressive actions they take against workers’ rights to freedom 
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of association and collective bargaining (Miller 2009: 23). Better Work’s current 
approach thus gives buyers and states all the reputational benefits of being 
publicly associated with the program, without subjecting them to any scrutiny 
regarding how their sourcing practices and repressive actions contribute to labour 
standards and rights violations in garment factories (IHRCRC & WRC 2013: 67; 
Miller 2009: 16-18). 
Conclusion: The prioritisation of buyers over workers 
The Better Work program is a vehicle through which the ILO seeks to mediate the 
contradictions between the pursuit of decent labour conditions and the dynamics 
of competitive capital accumulation in the global economy (Taylor 2011: 450). The 
ILO’s hope is that ‘socially responsible’ garment buyers may be persuaded to 
support the program in order to promote jobs and new exports while 
simultaneously strengthening protection for labour standards and workers’ rights 
(Seidman 2009: 588). However, Better Work has made limited progress towards 
its dual aims of economic and social upgrading. This is because the program 
notionally but ineffectually adapts the ILO’s tripartite model of labour governance 
to suit the needs of powerful garment firms operating in the developing world. 
Better Work therefore reinforces rather than disrupts the deeply embedded power 
imbalances and structures of inequality operating within the garment commodity 
chain that drive down labour standards and threaten workers’ rights. The program 
is ultimately more effective at legitimising and facilitating buyers’ control over 
their supply chains and brand reputation than it is at delivering improvements for 
workers. The concluding chapter of the thesis reflects upon the broader 
implications of the ILO’s institutionalisation of Better Work and the program’s 
expanding legitimacy and reach. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that Better Work’s limited impact on labour standards and 
workers’ rights is primarily the result of two processes – one theoretical and one 
political-economic. First, the global commodity chains (GCC) framework, which 
provides the conceptual basis of Better Work, is both capital-centric and gender-
neutral. The wider political-economic context and social relations within which 
commodity chains operate remain under-theorised. This means that labour, state 
institutions, and gender are noticeably absent in mainstream GCC research, with 
implications for policy elaboration and implementation. Second, the structural 
composition and power dynamics of the global political-economy have undergone 
major shifts since the 1970s with the advent of contemporary ‘globalisation’. These 
shifts were accompanied by significant contestation regarding the international 
labour standards and trade regimes, which led to institutional and political 
reconfigurations that prioritised the interests of capital over workers. Importantly, 
labour standards governance has been progressively voluntarised and privatised 
since the 1990s, with negative implications for workers at the bottom of GCCs. 
These struggles have gendered implications, given that women comprise the 
majority of the global labour force and are disproportionately concentrated in 
lower-paid, informal and ‘flexibilised’ jobs, including those that predominate at the 
bottom of GCCs.  
The ways in which particular political-economic ‘problems’ are conceptualised 
affects what ‘solutions’ are devised, how they are implemented, and their effects. 
This concluding chapter reflects on the significance of the thesis and suggests that 
the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) institutionalisation of Better Work 
and the program’s expanding legitimacy and reach have two broader implications 
for the international labour governance regime and for workers in buyer-driven 
commodity chains (BDCC) such as the garment industry. 
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The broader implications of Better Work 
The ILO has always endeavoured to maintain its relevance and legitimacy within 
the global political economy and is in constant need of ‘regaining the moral high 
ground in order to fend off criticism and mobilise resources’ to pursue its mandate 
of promoting labour standards and workers’ rights (Uvin 2002: 4). However as 
detailed in Chapter Two, the ILO has confronted significant challenges to its raison 
d’etre following the major structural, institutional, economic and political changes 
that began in the 1970s with the advent of contemporary globalisation processes 
(Berik & Rodgers 2010: 58; Helfer 2006: 706). Since the 1990s, the ILO has 
positioned itself as institutionally concomitant with a ‘neoliberal’ view of 
protective regulations and economic development that is accommodating of 
capital accumulation (Sheldon & Quinlan 2011: 22; Standing 2008: 367-368). 
Better Work should therefore be understood as part of a larger project initiated by 
the ILO with its Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998 
and the unveiling of the Decent Work agenda in 1999 (Selwyn 2013: 80-82; 
Sheldon & Quinlan 2011: 22-24; Standing 2008: 368-370). 
The first implication of Better Work’s institutionalisation is the way its market-
driven governance model replaces a ‘regulatory vacuum’ with a ‘regulatory 
conundrum’. The regulatory vacuum notionally addressed by Better Work is the 
so-called ‘race to the bottom’ in labour standards and workers’ rights in buyer-
driven commodity chains outlined in Chapter Two (Oka 2010: 59-60). However, 
Berik and Rodgers (2010: 73) suggest that the Better Work system is characterised 
by a ‘judge and jury’ problem, whereby the organisation charged with monitoring 
factory compliance (the ILO) also has the authority to compile and publish the 
results. This means the ILO is largely autonomous in determining whether 
particular factories are compliant or not. If the ILO seeks to signal program 
success, it may downplay non-compliance; it may also overcompensate for its lack 
of authority and enforcement power by taking a tougher stance (Berik & Rodgers 
2010: 73-74).  
The ILO clearly favours signalling program success, as it has sought to expand the 
Better Work program despite the problems facing Better Factories Cambodia 
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(BFC) (Miller 2009: 27-28). Rather than bolstering the program’s efficacy or 
ensuring that non-compliance issues are addressed, the ILO has made the program 
less transparent and has taken little action on pervasive issues such as declining 
wages and repressive actions against workers’ union rights. The result is that BFC 
and Better Work’s flawed monitoring and reporting procedures provide a 
misleading and incomplete picture of working conditions in factories (Finnegan 
2013: 25-27; Pruett 2005: 18).  
Better Work also relies on governments’ and manufacturers’ interest in positioning 
their country as a provider of ‘responsibly produced’ goods as a source of 
competitive advantage (Taylor 2011: 457). Given that every Better Work country 
depends significantly on their garment industry, none of the stakeholders in the 
program has a real interest in labour abuses coming to light (Seidman 2009: 594-
595; Taylor 2011: 455). The rapid rise and fall of garment exports from countries 
at the bottom of the commodity chain indicates that while export-led 
industrialisation may lead to fast economic growth in gross domestic product 
(GDP) terms, it comes with the risk of further relocations of production and does 
not guarantee widespread or sustainable ‘spillovers’ into the rest of the economy 
(Baldwin 2011: 33-34). Thus ‘branding an entire national industry ‘sweat-free’ 
might silence workers’ voices, rather than encouraging them, if the entire country’s 
exports depend upon presenting production as problem-free’ (Seidman 2009: 
594).  
Therein lays the regulatory conundrum of Better Work. If ‘workers’ jobs and the 
country’s economic livelihood depend on defending a ‘sweat-free’ brand, why 
would participants willingly reveal problems at work when to do so might 
undermine the industry’s appeal to global markets?’ (Seidman 2009: 595). In this 
sense, the purported act of unravelling the chain and ‘unveiling’ the conditions 
under which garments are produced has actually led to the creation of a new 
‘ethical’ veil (Guthman 2009: 199-205). This façade of improved labour 
governance has the potential to allay efforts to explore other possible avenues for 
improving labour standards and protecting workers’ rights (Alston 2004: 518). 
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The second implication of Better Work’s institutionalisation is therefore its 
disempowering and constraining effects upon workers’ struggles. Better Work 
relies on socially responsible buyers voluntarily ‘doing the right thing’ and 
subsequently delegitimises workers’ independent collective actions for 
threatening this endeavour. As argued in Chapter One, this is because the GCC 
‘social upgrading’ concept underpinning Better Work involves a top-down 
comprehension of relations between capital, the state and labour (Selwyn 2013: 
75). It is only partially equipped to explain the existence of deleterious work 
conditions because it denies that capital systematically exploits labour within the 
production process (Selwyn 2013: 80). Rather exploitation, when it occurs, is 
perceived to take place within the sphere of exchange as workers receive below-
market rates for their labour power (Selwyn 2013: 80).  
As established in Chapter One, capitalism is an ongoing, social, dynamic system 
undergoing constant processes of restructuring (Taylor 2011: 455). It is not simply 
a stable, technical process that can be administered through regulated negotiations 
(Munck 2009: 617-619; Taylor 2011: 455). Within this system, capital does not 
simply seek access to ‘cheap labour’ in terms of wages; it seeks to profit from 
access to labour forces with specific characteristics encompassing political 
questions over how, when and under what conditions labour can be utilised (Bair 
2010: 219; Taylor 2011: 450).  The positioning of buyers as the central agents in 
the promotion of labour standards and workers’ rights is therefore highly 
problematic, because it fails to acknowledge the active role played by those firms 
in the construction of global systems of inequality (Elias 2007: 57). It also 
marginalises how the program is woven into broader processes of capital 
accumulation, while reinforcing the uneven development of capital intrinsic to the 
spread of global commodity chains (Taylor 2011: 446).  
Capitalism involves dynamics of power and continuous cycles of resistance and 
accommodation by workers in the new global factories at the bottom of 
commodity chains (Munck 2009: 619). Better Work therefore mediates a series of 
struggles between overlapping and often irreconcilable interests along the 
garment commodity chain, including the conflict over the distribution of profits 
(Taylor 2011: 446-447). Given the program’s prioritisation of capital accumulation 
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and lack of will to more effectively remediate non-compliance issues, particularly 
in the areas of wages and union rights, workers and their unions will continue to 
seek solutions outside formal institutional processes in the form of strikes, 
protests and activist campaigns which serve to undermine the program’s claims of 
efficacy (Anner 2012: 634; Arnold 2013: 8; Miller 2009: 27). The irony is that one 
of the main impetuses for buyers and governments to participate in Better Work is 
to avoid such tactics (Anner 2012: 634). 
The contingency of political-economic compromises 
While the contemporary global political economy has ‘generated unprecedented 
wealth and global interconnections,’ it has done so ‘in a way which has exacerbated 
rather than overcome the contradictions of capitalism’ (Munck 2009: 624). The 
ILO is not a neutral or pluralist institution within this system. Rather, it plays an 
important role in reproducing and legitimating the status quo, drawing its power 
and contradictions from the relations of power found in global capitalism 
(Soederberg 2007: 508-509). This thesis has demonstrated that labour governance 
will always be a source of struggle and contestation between capital, the state, and 
labour and that Better Work reflects one particular configuration of these social 
relations.  Indeed, all political-economic compromises between capital, the state, 
and labour must be understood as historically contingent, subject to contestation, 
and inherently gendered. Therefore, future developments and reconfigurations in 
labour governance should be continually problematised from a gender-sensitive 
perspective that accounts for the role of labour and international institutions in the 
global political economy. 
  
76 
 
Bibliography 
Alben, E. (2001). GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective on the Labor-
Trade Link. Columbia Law Review, 101(6), pp. 1410-1447. 
Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic [referenced as Lowenstein 
Clinic] (2011). Tearing Apart at the Seams: How Widespread Use of Fixed-
Duration Contracts Threatens Cambodian Workers and the Cambodian 
Garment Industry. New Haven: Allard K. Lowenstein International Human 
Rights Clinic, Yale University. Retrieved August 3, 2013, from Yale Law 
School: 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/Cambodia_Tear
ingApartattheSeams.pdf 
Alston, P. (2004). 'Core Labour Standards' and the Transformation of the 
International Labour Rights Regime. European Journal of International Law, 
15(3), pp. 457-521. 
Anner, M. (2012). Corporate Social Responsibility and Freedom of Association 
Rights: The Precarious Quest for Legitimacy and Control in Global Supply 
Chains. Politics & Society, 40(4), pp. 609-644. 
Anner, M. S. (2000). Local and Transnational Campaigns to End Sweatshop 
Practices. In M. E. Gordon, & L. Turner (Eds.), Transnational Cooperation 
Among Labour Unions (pp. 238-255). Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Appelbaum, R. P., Bonacich, E. & Quan, K. (2005). The End of Apparel Quotas: A 
Faster Race to the Bottom? Santa Barbara: Centre for Global Studies. 
Retrieved September 21, 2013, from The University of California: 
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/40f8w19g  
Arnold, D. (2013). Workers’ Agency and Re-working Power Relations in Cambodia’s 
Garment Industry (No. 24). Capturing the Gains Working Paper. Manchester: 
The University of Manchester. Retrieved September 20, 2013, from 
Capturing the Gains: http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg-wp-2013-
24.pdf 
Arnold, D. G., & Hartman, L. P. (2005). Beyond Sweatshops: Positive Deviancy and 
Global Labour Practices. Business Ethics, 14(3), pp. 206-222. 
Arnold, D., & Toh, S. H. (2010). A Fair Model of Globalization? Labour and Global 
Production in Cambodia. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 40(3), pp. 401-424. 
Bahramitash, R. (2005). Liberation from Liberalization: Gender and Globalization in 
Southeast Asia. London: Zed Books Ltd. 
Bair, J. (2005). Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going 
Forward. Competition and Change, 9(2), pp. 153-180. 
77 
 
Bair, J. (2007). From the Politics of Development to the Challenges of Globalization. 
Globalizations, 4(4), pp. 486-499. 
Bair, J. (2008). Surveying the Post-MFA Landscape: What Prospects for the Global 
South Post-quota? Competition & Change, 12(1), pp. 3-10. 
Bair, J. (2009). Global Commodity Chains: Genealogy and Review. In J. Bair (Ed.), 
Frontiers of Commodity Chain Research (pp. 1-34). Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Bair, J. (2010). On Difference and Capital: Gender and the Globalization of 
Production. Signs, 36(1), pp. 203-226. 
Balaam, D. N., & Veseth, M. (2008). Introduction to International Political Economy 
(4th ed.). New Jersey: Pearson. 
Baldwin, R. (2011). Trade And Industrialisation After Globalisation's 2nd 
Unbundling: How Building And Joining A Supply Chain Are Different And Why 
It Matters (No. 17716). National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper. Oxford: University of Oxford. Retrieved September 20, 2013, from 
National Bureau of Economic Research: 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12590.pdf?new_window=1 
Barrientos, S., & Smith, S. (2007). Do Workers Benefit from Ethical Trade? 
Assessing Codes of Labour Practice in Global Production Systems. Third 
World Quarterly, 28(4), pp. 713-729. 
Barrientos, S., Gereffi, G., & Rossi, A. (2011). Economic and Social Upgrading in 
Global Production Networks: A New Paradigm for a Changing World. 
International Labour Review, 150(3-4), pp. 319-340. 
Becker, K. F. (2004). The Informal Economy. Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency Fact Finding Study. Retrieved September 30, 2012, 
from World Bank: 
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PapersLinks/Sida.pdf 
Beneria, L. (2003). Gender, Development and Globalization: Economics as if All 
People Mattered. New York: Routledge. 
Berik, G., & Rodgers, Y. V. (2010). Options for Enforcing Labour Standards: Lessons 
from Bangladesh and Cambodia. Journal of International Development, 
22(1), pp. 56-85. 
Better Factories Cambodia (2004). Eighth Synthesis Report on Working Conditions 
in Cambodia’s Garment Sector. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. 
Retrieved August 18, 2013, from Better Factories Cambodia: 
http://betterwork.com/cambodia/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/8th-
Synthesis-Report-English.pdf 
78 
 
Better Factories Cambodia (2012). Twenty-Eighth Synthesis Report on Working 
Conditions in Cambodia’s Garment Sector. Geneva: International Labour 
Organisation and International Finance Corporation. Retrieved August 18, 
2013, from Better Factories Cambodia: 
http://betterwork.com/cambodia/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Synthesis-Report-28th-Eng1.pdf 
Better Factories Cambodia (2013a). Thirtieth Synthesis Report on Working 
Conditions in Cambodia’s Garment Sector. Geneva: International Labour 
Organisation and International Finance Corporation. Retrieved August 18, 
2013, from Better Factories Cambodia: http://betterfactories.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/30th-Synthesis-Report-Final-EN.pdf 
Better Factories Cambodia (2013b). About Us: How We’re Funded. Retrieved 
August 24, 2013, from Better Factories Cambodia: 
http://betterwork.com/cambodia/?page_id=71 
Better Factories Cambodia (2013c). What We Do: Monitoring. Retrieved August 24, 
2013, from Better Factories Cambodia: 
http://betterfactories.org/?page_id=90 
Better Factories Cambodia (2013d). Purchasing BFC Assessment Reports. 
Retrieved August 24, 2013, from Better Factories Cambodia: 
http://betterfactories.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Report-
Subscriptions11.pdf 
Better Factories Cambodia (2013e). Twenty-Ninth Synthesis Report on Working 
Conditions in Cambodia’s Garment Sector. Geneva: International Labour 
Organisation and International Finance Corporation. Retrieved August 19, 
2013, from Better Factories Cambodia: 
http://betterwork.com/cambodia/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Synthesis-Report-29th-EN-Final.pdf 
Better Work (2012a). About Us. Retrieved March 14, 2013, from Better Work: 
http://betterwork.org/global/?page_id=300 
Better Work (2012b). About Us: ILO/IFC Partnership: Retrieved March 14, 2013, 
from Better Work: http://betterwork.org/global/?page_id=304 
Better Work (2012c). Better Work Jordan. Retrieved March 14, 2013, from Better 
Work: http://betterwork.org/global/?page_id=320 
Better Work (2012d). Better Work Haiti. Retrieved March 14, 2013, from Better 
Work: http://betterwork.org/global/?page_id=316 
Better Work (2012e). Better Work Vietnam. Retrieved March 14, 2013, from Better 
Work: http://betterwork.org/global/?page_id=326 
79 
 
Better Work (2012f). Better Work Lesotho. Retrieved March 14, 2013, from Better 
Work: http://betterwork.org/global/?page_id=322 
Better Work (2012g). Better Work Indonesia. Retrieved March 14, 2013, from 
Better Work: http://betterwork.org/global/?page_id=318 
Better Work (2012h). Better Work Nicaragua. Retrieved March 14, 2013, from 
Better Work: http://betterwork.org/global/?page_id=324 
Bonacich, E., & Waller, D. V. (1994). The Role of US Apparel Manufacturers in the 
Globalization of the Industry in the Pacific Rim. In E. Bonacich, L. Cheng, N. 
Chinchilla, N. Hamilton, & P. Ong (Eds.), Global Production: The Apparel 
Industry in the Pacific Rim (pp. 80-102). Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press. 
Bonacich, E., Cheng, L., Chinchilla, N., Hamilton, N., & Ong, P. (1994). The Garment 
Industry in the Restructuring Global Economy. In E. Bonacich, L. Cheng, N. 
Chinchilla, N. Hamilton, & P. Ong (Eds.), Global Production: The Apparel 
Industry in the Pacific Rim (pp. 3-18). Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Brickell, K. (2010). Gender, Poverty and Work in Cambodia. In S. Chant (Ed.), The 
International Handbook of Gender and Poverty (pp. 458-462). Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
Caraway, T. L. (2005). The Political Economy of Feminization: From "Cheap Labor" 
to Gendered Discourses of Work. Politics and Gender, 1(3), pp. 399-429. 
Caraway, T. L. (2006). Freedom of Association: Battering Ram or Trojan Horse? 
Review of International Political Economy, 13(2), pp. 210-232. 
Caraway, T. L. (2007). Assembling Women: The Feminization of Global 
Manufacturing. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Caraway, T. L. (2010). Labor Standards and Labor Market Flexibility in East Asia. 
Studies in Comparative International Development, 45(2), pp. 225-249. 
Castells, M., & Portes, A. (1989). World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and 
Effects of the Informal Economy. In L. A. Benton, M. Castells, & A. Portes 
(Eds.), The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed 
Countries (pp. 11-37). Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 
Chandararot, K. & Dannet, L. (2009). Living Wage Survey for Cambodia’s Garment 
Industry. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Institute of Development Study. Retrieved 
April 30, 2013, from International Labour Organisation: 
http://apirnet.ilo.org/resources/living-wage-survey-for-cambodias-
garment-industry/at_download/file1 
80 
 
Cheng, L., & Gereffi, G. (1994). US Retailers and Asian Garment Production. In E. 
Bonacich, L. Cheng, N. Chinchilla, N. Hamilton, & P. Ong (Eds.), Global 
Production: The Apparel Industry in the Pacific Rim (pp. 63-79). 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Christian, M., Evers, B. & Barrientos, S. (2013). Women in Value Chains: Making a 
Difference (No. 06.3). Capturing the Gains Revised Summit Briefing. 
Manchester: The University of Manchester. Retrieved September 20, 2013, 
from Capturing the Gains: 
http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg_briefing_note_6.3.pdf 
Clean Clothes Campaign (2007, March 14). Cambodian Trade Union Leader 
Murdered. Clean Clothes Campaign Press Release. Retrieved August 31, 
2013, from Clean Clothes Campaign: 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/2007/03/14/cambodian-trade-union-
leader-murdered 
Clean Clothes Campaign (2008, January 22). Clean Clothes Campaign Calls for 
Justice on Anniversary of Labor Leader’s Murder. Clean Clothes Campaign 
Press Release. Retrieved August 31, 2013, from Clean Clothes Campaign: 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/press-releases/2008/01/22/clean-
clothes-campaign-calls-for-justice-on-anniversary-of-labor-leaders-murder 
Coe, N. (2011). Geographies of Production II: A Global Production Network A-Z. 
Progress in Human Geography, 36(3), pp. 389-402. 
Coe, N. M., Dicken, P., & Hess, M. (2008). Global Production Networks: Realizing the 
Potential. Journal of Economic Geography, 8(3), pp. 271-295. 
Cumbers, A., Nativel, C., & Routledge, P. (2008). Labour Agency and Union 
Positionalities in Global Production Networks. Journal of Economic 
Geography, 8(3), pp. 369-387. 
Dasgupta, S., & Williams, D. (2010). Women Facing the Economic Crisis: the 
Garment Sector in Cambodia. In Poverty and Sustainable Development in 
Asia: Impacts and Responses to the Global Economic Crisis (pp. 149-168). 
Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank. 
Derks, A. (2008). Khmer Women on the Move: Exploring Work and Life in Urban 
Cambodia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
DeWinter, R. (2001). The Anti-Sweatshop Movement: Constructing Corporate 
Moral Agency in the Global Apparel Industry. Ethics & International Affairs, 
15(2), pp. 99-115. 
Dicaprio, A. (2013). The Demand Side of Social Protection: Lessons from 
Cambodia's Labor Rights Experience. World Development, 48(1), pp. 108-
119. 
81 
 
Doucet, I. (2013, July 11). Made in Haiti, Dumped in Haiti: Slave Labor and the 
Garment Industry. Global Research. Retrieved September 25, 2013, from 
Global Research: http://www.globalresearch.ca/made-in-haiti-dumped-in-
haiti-slave-labor-and-the-garment-industry/5342396 
Dussel-Peters, E. (2008). GCCs and Development: A Conceptual and Empirical 
Review. Competition & Change, 12(1), pp. 11-27. 
Eisenstein, H. (2005). A Dangerous Liason? Feminism and Corporate Globalization. 
Science & Society, 3(69), pp. 487-518. 
Elias, J. (2003). International Labour Standards, Codes of Conduct and Gender 
Issues: A Review of Recent Debates and Controversies. Non-State Actors and 
International Law, 3(2-3), pp. 283-301. 
Elias, J. (2007). Women Workers and Labour Standards: the Problem of 'Human 
Rights'. Review of International Studies, 33(1), pp. 45-57. 
Elson, D. (1999). Labor Markets as Gendered Institutions: Equality, Efficiency and 
Empowerment Issues. World Development, 27(3), pp. 611-627. 
Ernst, C., Ferrer, A. H. & Zult, D. (2005). The End of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement and 
its Implication for Trade and Employment (No. 16). Employment Strategy 
Working Paper. Retrieved July 30, 2013, from International Labour 
Organisation: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_elm/docum
ents/publication/wcms_114030.pdf 
Esbenshade, J. (2008). Going Up Against the Global Economy: New Developments 
in the Anti-Sweatshops Movement. Critical Sociology, 34(3), pp. 453-470. 
Finnegan, B. (2013). Responsibility Outsourced: Social Audits, Workplace 
Certification and Twenty Years of Failure to Protect Worker Rights. American 
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). 
Retrieved August 30, 2013, from AFL-CIO: 
http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/77061/1902391/CSReport.pdf 
Gereffi, G. (1994). The Organization of Buyer-Driven Commodity Chains: How US 
Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks. In G. Gereffi, & M. 
Korzeniewicz (Eds.), Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (pp. 95-122). 
Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Gereffi, G. (1999). International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel 
Commodity Chain. Journal of International Economics, 48(1), pp. 37-70. 
Gereffi, G. (2013). Global Value Chains in a Post-Washington Consensus World. 
Review of International Political Economy, 3(1), pp. 1-29. 
82 
 
Gibbon, P. (2008). Governance, Entry Barriers, Upgrading: A Re-Interpretation of 
Some GVC Concepts from the Experience of African Clothing Exports. 
Competition & Change, 12(1), pp. 29-48. 
Gimenez, M. (2004). Connecting Marx and Feminism in the Era of Globalization: A 
Preliminary Investigation. Socialism and Democracy, 18(1), pp. 85-105. 
Gimenez, M. (2005). Capitalism and the Oppression of Women: Marx Revisited. 
Science & Society, 69(1), pp. 11-32. 
Goto, K. (2011). Competitiveness and Decent Work in Global Value Chains: 
Substitutionary or Complementary? Development in Practice, 21(7), pp. 943-
958. 
Green, N. (2009, June 12). Garment Makers Look For Answers. Phnom Penh Post. 
Retrieved August 14, 2013, from Phnom Penh Post: 
www.phnompenhpost.com/business/garment-makers-look-answers  
Guthman, J. (2009). Unveiling the Unveiling: Commodity Chains, Commodity 
Fetishism, and the "Value" of Voluntary, Ethical Food Labels. In J. Bair (Ed.), 
Frontiers of Global Commodity Chain Research (pp. 190-206). Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Hale, A. (2000). What Hope for "Ethical" Trade in the Globalised Garment Industry? 
Antipode, 32(4), pp. 349-356. 
Hale, A., & Burns, M. (2005). The Phase-Out of the MFA from the Perspective of 
Workers. In A. Hale, & J. Wills (Eds.), Threads of Labour: Garment Industry 
Supply Chains from the Workers' Perspective (pp. 210-233). Carlton: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Hale, A., & Shaw, L. M. (2001). Women Workers and the Promise of Ethical Trade in 
the Globalised Garment Industry: A Serious Beginning? Antipode, 33(3), pp. 
510-530. 
Hall, J. A. (2010). The ILO's Better Factories Cambodia Program: A Viable Blueprint 
for Promoting International Labor Rights? Stanford Law & Policy Review, 
21(3), pp. 427-260. 
Heinonen, U. (2008). The Hidden Role of Informal Economy: Is Informal Economy 
Insignificant for Phnom Penh's Development? In M. Keskinen, M. Kunnu, & 
O. Varis (Eds.), Modern Myths of the Mekong (pp. 123-132). Helsinki: Water 
and Development Publications. 
Heintz, J. (2007). Human Development and Clothing Manufacturing in Cambodia: 
Challenges and Strategies for the Garment Industry. Political Economy 
Research Institute. Women in Informal Employment Globalising and 
Organising (WIEGO). Retrieved April 25, 2013, from WIEGO: 
83 
 
http://wiego.org/sites/wiego.org/files/publications/files/Heintz-
Cambodia-Garment-Report.pdf 
Helfer, L. R. (2006). Understanding Change in International Organizations: 
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO. Vanderbilt Law Review, 59(3), pp. 
649-726. 
Henderson, J., Coe, N. M., Hess, M., Dicken, P., & Yeung, H. (2002). Global Production 
Networks and the Analysis of Economic Development. Review of 
International Political Economy, 9(3), pp. 436-464. 
Hensman, R. (2001). World Trade and Workers’ Rights: In Search of an 
Internationalist Position. In P. Waterman, & J. Wills (Eds.), Place, Space and 
the New Labour Internationalisms (pp. 123-146). Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd. 
Hughes, C. (2007). Transnational Networks, International Organizations and 
Political Participation in Cambodia: Human Rights, Labour Rights and 
Common Rights. Democratization, 14(5), pp. 834-852. 
Hurley, J. (2005). Unravelling the Web: Supply Chains and Workers' Lives in the 
Garment Industry. In A. Hale, & J. Wills (Eds.), Threads of Labour: Garment 
Industry Supply Chains from the Workers' Perspective (pp. 95-132). Carlton: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights (2012). Ten Years into the US-Jordan 
Free Trade Agreement Brutal Sweatshop Conditions Endure. Pittsburgh: 
Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights. Retrieved September 20, 
2013, from Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights: 
http://www.globallabourrights.org/admin/reports/files/1203-Rich-
Pine.pdf 
International Human Rights Clinic and Resolution Centre & Workers’ Rights 
Consortium [cited as IHRCRC & WRC] (2013). Monitoring in the Dark: An 
Evaluation of the International Labour Organization's Better Factories 
Cambodia Monitoring and Reporting Program. Stanford: Mills Legal Clinic, 
Stanford Law School. Retrieved July 4, 2013, from Stanford Law School: 
http://humanrightsclinic.law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Monitoring-in-the-Dark-Stanford-WRC.pdf 
International Labour Organisation (2013). About the ILO: Origins and History. 
Retrieved August 10, 2013, from International Labour Organisation: 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm 
International Monetary Fund (2013). About the IMF: What We Do. Retrieved 
October 3, 2013, from International Monetary Fund: 
http://www.imf.org/external/about/whatwedo.htm 
84 
 
Islam, M. A., & McPhail, K. (2011). Regulating for Corporate Human Rights Abuses: 
The Emergence of Corporate Reporting on the ILO's Human Rights 
Standards Within the Global Garment Manufacturing and Retail Industry. 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 22(8), pp. 790-810. 
Kaur, A. (2004). Economic Globalisation, Trade Liberalisation and Labour-
Intensive Export Manufacturers: An Asian Perspective. In A. Kaur (Ed.), 
Women Workers in Industrialising Asia: Costed, Not Valued (pp. 37-58). New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mayer, F. & Pickles, J. (2010). Re-embedding Governance: Global Apparel Value 
Chains and Decent Work (No. 1). Capturing the Gains Working Paper. 
Manchester: The University of Manchester. Retrieved 20 September, 2013, 
from Capturing the Gains: http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg-wp-
2010-1.pdf 
Mehrotra, S. (2009). The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Informal Sector and 
Poverty in East Asia. Global Social Policy, 9(1), pp. 101-118. 
Merk, J. (2012). 10 Years of the Better Factories Cambodia Project: A Critical 
Evaluation. Community Legal Education Centre & Clean Clothes Campaign. 
Retrieved 10 March, 2013, from Clean Clothes Campaign: 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/ccc-clec-
betterfactories-29-8.pdf/view 
Micheletti, M., & Stolle, D. (2007). Mobilizing Consumers to Take Responsibility for 
Global Social Justice. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 611(1), pp. 157-175. 
Miller, D. (2009). Business as Usual? Governing the Supply Chain in Clothing Post 
MFA Phase-out: The Case of Cambodia. International Journal of Labour 
Research, 1(1), pp. 9-33. 
Munck, R. (2009). Afterword: Beyond the 'New' International Labour Studies. Third 
World Quarterly, 30(3), pp. 617-625. 
Murray, J. (2002). Labour Rights/Corporate Responsibilities: The Role of ILO 
Labour Standards. In In R. Jenkins, R. Pearson, & G. Seyfang (Eds.), 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Labour Rights: Codes of Conduct in the 
Global Economy (pp. 31-42). London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. 
Natsuda, K., Goto, K., & Thoburn, J. (2010). Challenges to the Cambodian Garment 
Industry in the Global Garment Value Chain. European Journal of 
Development Research, 22(4), pp. 469-493. 
Nam, S. (2005). Gender and Development in the Liberalizing of the Garment Trade in 
Cambodia. Human Rights Centre Fellowship Report. Berkeley: University of 
California. Retrieved 13 August, 2013, from Human Rights Centre: 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/HRCweb/pdfs/fellow-report05_snam.pdf 
85 
 
Oka, C. (2010). Accounting for Gaps in Labour Standards Compliance: The Role of 
Reputation-Conscious Buyers in the Cambodian Garment Industry. 
European Journal of Development Research, 22(1), pp. 59-78. 
O'Rourke, D. (2006). Multi-stakeholder Regulation: Privatizing or Socializing 
Labour Standards? World Development, 34(5), pp. 899-918. 
Oxfam Australia (2013). Countries Where We Work: Cambodia. Retrieved August 
30, 2013, from Oxfam Australia: https://www.oxfam.org.au/about-
us/countries-where-we-work/cambodia/ 
Palpacuer, F. (2008). Bringing the Social Context Back In: Governance and Wealth 
Distribution in Global Commodity Chains. Economy and Society, 37(3), pp. 
393-419. 
Pearson, R. (2003). Feminist Responses to Economic Globalisation: Some Examples 
of Past and Future Practice. Gender and Development, 11(1), pp. 25-34. 
Pearson, R. (2007). Beyond Women Workers: Gendering CSR. Third World 
Quarterly, 28(4), pp. 731-749. 
Pearson, R. & Seyfang, G. (2002). ‘I’ll Tell You What I Want…’: Women Workers and 
Codes of Conduct. In R. Jenkins, R. Pearson, & G. Seyfang (Eds.), Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Labour Rights: Codes of Conduct in the Global 
Economy (pp. 43-60). London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. 
Polaski, S. (2006). Combining Global and Local Forces: The Case of Labor Rights in 
Cambodia. World Development, 34(5), pp. 919-932. 
Pruett, D. 2005. Looking for a Quick Fix: How Weak Social Auditing is Keeping 
Workers in Sweatshops. Clean Clothes Campaign. Retrieved 10 March, 2013, 
from Clean Clothes Campaign: 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/05-quick-
fix.pdf/view 
Quan, K. (2008). Use of Global Value Chains by Labor Organizers. Competition & 
Change, 12(1), pp. 89-104. 
Rai, S. M. (2004). Gendering Global Governance. International Feminist Journal of 
Politics, 6(4), pp. 579-601. 
Roberts, A., & Soederberg, S. (2012). Gender Equality as Smart Economics? A 
critique of the 2012 World Development Report. Third World Quarterly, 
33(5), pp. 949-968. 
Ruwanpura, K. N. (2011). Women Workers in the Apparel Sector: A Three Decade 
(R)evolution of Feminist Contributions? Progress in Development Studies, 
11(3), pp. 197-209. 
86 
 
Scheuerman, W. E. (2001). False Humanitarianism? US Advocacy of Transnational 
Labour Protections. Review of International Political Economy, 8(3), pp. 359-
388. 
Seguino, S. (2003). Taking Gender Differences in Bargaining Power Seriously: Equity, 
Labor Standards, and Living Wages (No. 6508). Munich Personal RePEc 
Archive (MPRA) Paper. Munich: Munich University. Retrieved August 30, 
2013, from MPRA: http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/6508/2/MPRA_paper_6508.pdf 
Seidman, G. W. (2007). Beyond the Boycott: Labour Rights, Human Rights, and 
Transnational Activism. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Seidman, G. W. (2009). Labouring Under an Illusion? Lesotho's 'Sweat-Free' Label. 
Third World Quarterly, 30(3), pp. 581-598. 
Selwyn, B. (2012). Beyond Firm-Centrism: Re-integrating Labour and Capitalism 
into Global Commodity Chain Analysis. Journal of Economic Geography, 
12(1), pp. 205-226. 
Selwyn, B. (2013). Social Upgrading and Labour in Global Production Networks: A 
Critique and Alternative Conception. Competition and Change, 17(1), pp. 75-
90. 
Shannon, S. (2010). Protecting Human Rights from Corporate Actions: Augmenting 
Responsibility, Accountability and Professional Ethics. Journal of Human 
Security, 6(1), pp. 22-37. 
Shea, A., Nakayama, M., & Heymann, J. (2010). Improving Labour Standards in 
Clothing Factores: Lessons from Stakeholder Views and Monitoring Results 
in Cambodia. Global Social Policy, 10(1), pp. 85-110. 
Sheldon, P., & Quinlan, M. (2011). The Enforcement of Minimum Labour Standards 
in an Era of Neoliberal Globalization. The Economic and Labour Relations 
Review, 22(2), pp. 5-32. 
Siegle, L. (2011). To Die For: Is Fashion Wearing Out the World? London: Fourth 
Estate. 
Smith, A., Rainnie, A., Dunford, M., Hardy, J., Hudson, R., & Sadler, D. (2002). 
Networks of Value, Commodities and Regions: Reworking Divisions of 
Labour in Macro-Regional Economies. Progress in Human Geography, 26(1), 
pp. 41-63. 
Snyder, R. L. (2008). Fugitive Denim: A Moving Story of People and Pants in the 
Borderless World of Global Trade. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 
87 
 
Soederberg, S. (2007). Taming Corporations or Buttressing Market-Led 
Development? A Critical Assessment of the Global Compact. Globalisations, 
4(4), pp. 500-513. 
Standing, G. (2008). The ILO: An Agency for Globalization? Development and 
Change, 39(3), pp. 355-384. 
Staritz, C. (2010). Making the Cut? Low-income Countries and the Global Clothing 
Value Chain in a Post-quota and Post-crisis World. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. Retrieved October 3, 2013, from World Bank: http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/
01/07/000334955_20110107051736/Rendered/PDF/588510PUB0Maki1
01public10BOX353816B.pdf 
Starosta, G. (2010). Global Commodity Chains and the Marxian Law of Value. 
Antipode, 42(2), pp. 433-465. 
Taylor, M. (2007). Rethinking the Global Production of Uneven Development. 
Globalizations, 4(4), pp. 529-542. 
Taylor, M. (2009). Who Works for Globalization? The Challenges and Possibilities 
for International Labour Studies. Third World Quarterly, 30(3), pp. 435-452. 
Taylor, M. (2011). Race to the Bottom... and Back Again? The Uneven Development 
of Labour Codes of Conduct. New Political Economy, 16(4), pp. 445-462. 
Uvin, P. (2002). On High Moral Ground: The Incorporation of Human Rights by the 
Development Enterprise. Praxis: The Fletcher Journal of Development 
Studies, 17(1), pp. 1-11. 
Wells, D. (2006). "Best Practice" in the Regulation of International Labour 
Standards: Lessons of the US-Cambodia Textile Agreement. Comparative 
Labor Law & Policy Journal, 27(3), pp. 357-376. 
Wetterberg, A. (2011). Public-Private Partnership in Labor Standards Governance: 
Better Factories Cambodia. Public Administration and Development, 31(1), 
pp. 64-73. 
Wright, E. O. (2000). Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class 
Compromise. American Journal of Sociology, 105(4), pp. 957-1002. 
Workers’ Rights Consortium (2013a). Global Wage Trends for Apparel Workers, 
2001-2011. Retrieved July 22, 2013, from Center for American Progress: 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/RealWageStudy-3.pdf 
Workers’ Rights Consortium (2013b). Made in Vietnam: Labor Rights Violations in 
Vietnam’s Export Manufacturing Sector. Retrieved September 24, 2013, from 
88 
 
Workers’ Rights Consortium:  
http://www.workersrights.org/linkeddocs/WRC_Vietnam_Briefing_Paper.p
df 
World Bank (2013). About: What We Do. Retrieved October 3, 2013, from World 
Bank: http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do 
